The University of Iowa College of Law
University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper
Number 07-29
November, 2007

Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy
Mortgage Claims

Katherine M. Porter
College of Law, University of Iowa

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic library
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961

Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims
Vol. 87 TEXAS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008)
Katherine Porter*
Abstract
The greatest fear of many families in serious financial trouble is that they
will lose their homes. Bankruptcy offers a last chance for families to save their
homes by halting a foreclosure and by repaying any default on their mortgage
loans over a period of years. Mortgage companies participate in bankruptcy by
filing claims with the court for the amount of the mortgage debt. To retain their
homes, bankruptcy debtors must pay these amounts. This process is wellestablished and, until now, uncontroversial. The assumption is that the protective
elements of the federal bankruptcy shield vulnerable homeowners from harm.
This Article examines the actual behavior of mortgage companies in
consumer bankruptcy cases. Using original data from 1700 recent Chapter 13
bankruptcy cases, I conclude that mortgage companies frequently do not comply
with applicable law. A majority of mortgage claims are missing one or more of
the required pieces of documentation for a bankruptcy claim. Furthermore, fees
are often poorly identified, making it impossible to verify if such charges are
legally permissible or accurate. In nearly all cases, debtors and mortgage
companies disagree on the amount of outstanding mortgage debt.
Despite these irregularities, mortgage claims in bankruptcy are
infrequently contested. Imposing unambiguous legal rules does not ensure that a
system will actually function to safeguard the rights of parties. The findings of this
Article are a chilling reminder of the limits of formal law to protect consumers.
Observing that laws can underperform has crucial implications for designing
legal systems that will function as intended and for evaluating the appropriate
scope of consumer protection.
Misbehavior or mistake by mortgage servicers can have grave
consequences. Undocumented or bloated claims jeopardize a family’s ability to
save its home. Beyond bankruptcy, poor or abusive mortgage servicing
undermines America’s homeownership policies by exposing families to risks of
overpaying or unjustified foreclosures. This Article’s findings offer an empirical
measure of whether consumers can trust mortgage companies to adhere to
applicable laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Families in serious financial trouble are under great stress. The telephone rings
with repeated calls from debt collectors, each paycheck is at risk of garnishment, and the
next knock on the door could be a process server or a repo agent. Yet, for many families,
the greatest fear is losing their home to foreclosure. A home is not only most families’
largest asset, but also a tangible marker of their financial aspirations and middle-class
status. A threatened or pending foreclosure can signal the end of a family’s ability to
struggle against financial collapse and an unrecoverable tumble down the socioeconomic
ladder.
Bankruptcy offers these families one last chance to save their homes. A
bankruptcy filing halts a pending foreclosure and gives families the right under federal law
to cure any defaults on mortgage loans over a period of years.1 The bankruptcy system
offers refuge from the vagaries of state foreclosure law, substituting the protections of a
federal court system and uniform legal rules to ensure that families get one final
opportunity to preserve their homes.
But this protection comes at a cost. Mortgage companies file proofs of claim with
the bankruptcy court for the amount of the mortgage debt. In turn, bankrupt debtors must
pay these claims or lose their homes. The balance between the family and the mortgage
lender is clearly spelled out in the bankruptcy laws, which specify the manner in which the
amount owed is to be established and obligate both the homeowner and the mortgage
company to disclose information accurately.
1

Raisa Bahchieva, Susan Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sustainability of
Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73 (Patrick Bolton & Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005) (stating
that Chapter 13 bankruptcy is frequently used by families who face foreclosure).
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This claims process is well-established and, until now, uncontroversial.
Homeowners—backed up by lawyers, policymakers, and news reporters—assume that
bankruptcy functions according to the official rules and, by following these rules, that
bankruptcy provides a realistic opportunity for families to save their homes. The data
revealed in this Article suggest, however, that mortgage companies often disobey the law
and that the legal system does not substantiate the amounts that lenders assert that
consumers owe. These problems can cripple a family’s efforts to save its home and
undermine policies of sustainable homeownership.
This Article examines the actual behavior of mortgage companies in the consumer
bankruptcy system. Using original data from 1700 recent Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, I
conclude that mortgagees’ behavior significantly threatens bankruptcy’s purpose of
helping families save their homes. Despite unambiguous federal rules designed to protect
homeowners and to ensure the integrity of the bankruptcy process,2 mortgage companies
frequently fail to comply with the laws that govern bankruptcy claims. A majority of
mortgage claims lack the required documentation necessary to establish a valid debt. Fees
and charges on bankruptcy claims often are identified poorly and sometimes do not appear
to be legally permissible. On an aggregate level, mortgage creditors assert that bankrupt
families owe them at least one billion dollars more than the families who file bankruptcy
believe they owe. Although infractions are frequent and irregularities are sometimes
egregious, the bankruptcy system routinely processes mortgage claims that do not comply
with legal procedures. Far from serving as a significant check against mistake or
misbehavior, the bankruptcy system routinely processes mortgage claims that cannot be
validated and are not, in fact, lawful.
These findings are important because they offer a rare glimpse into the high-stakes
world of mortgage servicing. Whether a bankrupt family can save its home turns on the
family being able to find the dollars to cure its mortgage arrearage. The data on missing
documentation, unsubstantiated fees, and discrepancies in recordkeeping, combined with
the growing body of case law sanctioning mortgage servicers for their conduct, raise the
specter that many families may be overcharged or may unfairly lose their homes. Such
realities undermine bankruptcy’s goal of helping families save their homes.
The misbehavior or mistakes of mortgage servicers identified in the bankruptcy
data are not specific to the bankruptcy process. Indeed, the reliability of mortgage
servicing may be worse for ordinary, non-bankrupt Americans. When such families face
foreclosure, they lack the safeguards of the bankruptcy system such as specific and
uniform federal laws, bankruptcy trustees, specialized federal courts, and representation by
counsel, to ensure that mortgage servicers are complying with consumer protection laws.
This Article’s findings suggest that flawed mortgage servicing practices are a key
contributor to the current crisis in the home mortgage market. Crafting an effective policy
response to help homeowners requires regulators and policymakers to recognize how poor
mortgage servicing threatens families’ efforts to save their homes.
The evidence of unreliable mortgage servicing also provides a powerful lesson on
the limits of formal law. The procedures for bankruptcy claims were thoughtfully designed
to balance the concerns of consumers and industry. The written law contains clear
2

See, e.g., In re Matus, 303 B.R. 660, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004) (“The [bankruptcy] statutes are designed to
insure that complete, truthful and reliable information is put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so that
decisions can be made by the parties in interest based on fact rather than fiction.”).
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instructions, and parties are given the opportunity to object to inappropriate conduct.
Indeed, the claims system has functioned for decades without generating calls for reform.
Yet, reality is far from the ideal suggested by these external markers of system reliability.
The data show that there are significant defects in the bankruptcy system, a chilling
reminder that imposing unambiguous legal rules does not ensure that a system will
actually function to protect the rights of parties. In the context of consumer transactions,
where individuals are not repeat players or institutional actors, observing that laws
underperform has crucial implications that echo far beyond bankruptcy policy. An
effective legal system requires more than merely putting words into law and relying on
silence as an indication of acceptable and just behavior. These data suggest that effective
enforcement mechanisms or structural incentives for industry compliance can be as
important as the rigor of the substantive rules.
Part I of this Article examines the incentives for mortgage servicers to comply with
applicable laws and describes reported incidences of abusive servicing. Part II describes the
study’s methodology. Part III presents original data on the legality and accuracy of mortgage
claims. These data show a high incidence of unreliable servicing behavior, even in the context of
the heightened procedural protections in bankruptcy. Part IV develops the policy implications of
the findings and proposes structural solutions to reduce the risks that poor mortgage servicing
imposes on homeowners and the legal system. Without improved procedures and enforcement
activity, homeowners in financial trouble—both inside and outside bankruptcy—remain
vulnerable to mortgagees’ misbehaviors and mistakes.
I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Americans pursue homeownership to build wealth and to improve their financial position.
The explosion of subprime lending and the rapid maturation of the securitization market for
mortgages have fueled occasional criticisms of mortgage servicers, who are intermediaries
between consumers and mortgage holders.3 Consumers have complained of overcharges and
difficulty in obtaining accurate loan information. Increasingly, these problems are erupting into
litigation, most frequently in bankruptcy courts. Although policymakers have focused on loan
origination,4 consumers can suffer dire harms from poor mortgage servicing. Errors or
overcharges increase the cost of homeownership and expose families to the risk of wrongful
foreclosure. This part explains the serious consequences of mortgage servicing and collects the
scattered reports of servicing abuse. This review highlights the need for a systematic examination
of the reliability of mortgage servicing.
A. The Structure and Function of Mortgage Servicing
Mortgage servicing is the collection of payments from borrowers and the disbursement of
those payments to the appropriate parties such as lenders, investors, taxing authorities, and

3

In this Article, I refer only to servicers, but lenders who service their own loans may engage in similar behavior to
third-party servicers.
4
See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Attorney General, States Settle with Household Finance: Up to $484 Million for
Consumers (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/oct_2002/Household_Chicago.html (reporting that
settlement with Household Finance for misrepresentation and disclosure violations at loan origination was the
largest-ever direct restitution settlement).
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insurers.5 The rise of servicing as a distinct industry results from the widespread use of
securitization in the mortgage market.6 Put simply, securitization is the process of creating debt
instruments (usually bonds) by pooling mortgage loans, transferring those obligations to a trust,
and then selling investors fractional interests in the trust’s pool of mortgages.7 These investors
receive periodic payments on their investments. Servicers act as intermediaries between the
borrower and the other parties to the securitization. A pooling and servicing agreement sets out
the servicer’s responsibilities for collecting and remitting the mortgage payments. The
participation of servicers complicates the borrower-lender relationship and limits flexibility in
loss mitigation and default situations.
Mortgage servicers do not have a customer relationship with homeowners; they work for
the investors who own the mortgage-backed securities.8 Borrowers cannot shop for a loan based
on the quality of the servicing, and they have virtually no ability to change servicers if they are
dissatisfied with the servicers’ conduct.9 The only exit strategy is refinancing the mortgage, and
even then, the homeowner may find the new loan assigned to its prior servicer. Because their
customers are the trustees who hire them to collect on behalf of investors, servicers have few
reputational or financial constraints to work to satisfy homeowners with their performance.10
In fact, servicers have a financial incentive to impose additional fees on consumers.
Mortgage servicers earn revenue in three major ways. First, they receive a fixed fee for each
loan. Typical arrangements pay servicers between .25% and 1.375% of the note principal for
each loan.11 Second, servicers earn “float” income from accrued interest between when
consumers pay and when those funds are remitted to investors. Third, servicers often are
permitted to retain all, or part, of any default fees, such as late charges, that consumers pay.12 In
this way, a borrower’s default can boost a servicer’s profits.13 A significant fraction of servicers’
total revenue comes from retained fee income.14 Because of this structure, servicers’ incentives
upon default may not align with investors’ incentives.15 Servicers have incentives to make it
difficult for consumers to cure defaults.
5

Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 753, 755
(2004).
6
Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Testimony before U.S. House Comm. on Financial Services (Apr. 17, 2007) (“Prior to
the widespread use of securitization, home finance typically involved a bank or savings institution granting a loan to
a borrower. The lending institution would make the decision to grant credit, fund the loan, and collect payments.”).
7
See generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED
FINANCE, AND CAPITAL MARKETS (2004) (providing an introduction to securitization and examining the legal issues
relevant to securitized transactions).
8
Lenders do have a customer relationship with borrowers and may want to retain them as repeat customers. Some
lenders retain the servicing obligations when they sell loans on the secondary market, but the active market for
servicing contracts means that very few customers will find their loan is serviced by the originating lender.
9
Jack Guttentag, Why is Mortgage Servicing So Bad?, Feb. 3, 2003, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20%20Servicing/why_is_servicing_so_bad.htm.
10
Id.
11
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES 23 (2006 Supp.) [hereinafter Nat’l Consumer Law Center].
12
Eggert, supra note 5, at 758 (explaining that servicers’ conventional fee is a percentage of the total value of the
loan but that servicers typically have the right to retain any default fees).
13
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 11 at 13.
14
Some information can be gleaned from the securities filings of public companies that service mortgages. Late
charges account for approximately 11% of revenues for Ocwen’s residential mortgage servicing division in 2006.
See Ocwen Financial Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Mar. 16, 2007). Cf. RONALD MANN, CHARGING
AHEAD 23 (2006) (reporting that credit card issuers earn 9% of their revenue from penalty fees).
15
Statement of Sheila C. Bair, supra note 6, at 9.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961

6

Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims

A consumer is only obligated to pay charges if the charges are permitted by the terms of
the mortgage and by state and federal law. To validate such charges, consumers must know how
the servicer calculated the amount due and whether such fees are consistent with their loan
contract. A lending industry representative has admitted that “[m]ost people don’t understand the
most basic things about their mortgage payment.”16Mortgage servicers can exploit consumers’
difficulty in recognizing errors or overcharges by failing to provide comprehensible or complete
information. In fact, poor service to consumers can actually maximize servicers’ profits.17
Indeed, it appears that servicers fail to satisfy customers. A study of consumer satisfaction with
business services found that only 10% of borrowers are happy with their mortgage servicer.18
Spiking foreclosure rates and pressure from Wall Street may exacerbate problems with
mortgage servicing.19 Falling real estate prices have changed the profit calculus of foreclosure,
encouraging lenders to reach out to delinquent borrowers. Facing political and financial pressure,
lenders and servicers are struggling to develop cost- and time-effective strategies for loss
mitigation.20 However, cash-strapped lenders have fewer resources than ever to devote to loan
servicing. Just as more borrowers risk losing their homes, servicers may have to lay off
employees, skimp on procedural safeguards, or reduce investment in technology. These changes
do not portend well for borrowers in high-cost loans or those seeking loan modifications.21
Mortgage servicing is a crucial part of the homeownership process that must be part of any
response to the rising foreclosure rate and downturn in the mortgage market.
B. Homeowners in Bankruptcy
Most consumers who file Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases are homeowners.22 The
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code impose new burdens on mortgage servicers. In turn, these
complexities create new opportunities for mortgage servicing abuse. The harms of poor
mortgage servicing are heightened in bankruptcy, a refuge for families trying to save their
homes.
When a borrower files bankruptcy, the creditor is barred by the automatic stay from
pursuing other legal action to collect the debt.23 Pending foreclosures may not proceed against
the debtor’s home, unless the court grants the creditor permission to do so.24 Many homeowners

16

Lenders Look for Way to Avoid Bankruptcy Maze, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 30, 2004.
Guttentag, supra note 9.
18
Press Release, J.D. Powers and Associates, Customer Service and Attention to Detail Drive Home Mortgage
Satisfaction (Nov. 26, 2002), http://www.jdpower.com/corporate/news/releases/pressrelease.aspx?ID=2002144.
19
Posting of Tara Twomey to Credit Slips blog, Subprime Servicing Getting Worse,
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2007/03/subprime_servic.html (Mar. 19, 2007).
20
Ruth Simon, Digging Out of Delinquency, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2007, at D1 (“The sharp rise in delinquencies in
recent months is straining mortgage companies’ ability to respond quickly to borrowers, with such solutions as new
repayment plans or modifications to loan agreements.”); Carrick Mollenkamp, Faulty Assumptions, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 200, at A1 (describing HSBC’s expanded loss mitigation efforts).
21
See Kurt Eggert, What Prevents Loan Modifications, 18 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 279 (2007) (documenting
barriers that servicers face in loan modifications).
22
TERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS
IN DEBT 202 (2000) (half of all bankruptcy debtors are homeowners); Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 1,
at 104–05 (explaining that homeowners disproportionately choose Chapter 13 because Chapter 7 does not protect
home equity).
23
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
24
11 U.S.C. § 362(b).
17
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are in default on their mortgage loans when they seek bankruptcy relief.25 Because families
typically struggle for months before filing bankruptcy,26 their mortgage accounts at the time of
bankruptcy may be loaded with default charges, penalty fees, and foreclosure costs. To retain
their homes in bankruptcy, Chapter 13 requires debtors to pay, in full, these arrearage amounts
(including any regular monthly payments that were not made before the bankruptcy.)27
To establish the arrearage amount that must be cured, creditors usually file proofs of
claim.28 Even if a loan is not in default, many mortgagees will file a claim to establish the
amount of outstanding principal. While liens on a debtor’s property pass unaffected through
bankruptcy,29 barring a specific challenge based on special bankruptcy avoidance powers, 30
creditors who wish to receive distributions from trustee must file claims.31 Liens on debtor’s
property pass through bankruptcy unaffected, unless there is a specific challenge based on
special bankruptcy avoidance powers. However, creditors who wish to receive distributions
from the trustee must file claims. Trustees normally pay arrearage amounts to servicers from
debtors’ Chapter 13 payments. In some jurisdictions, trustees also collect and transmit the
regular ongoing mortgage payments to servicers.32
A claims process is incorporated into every bankruptcy case to determine how much each
creditor is owed and to adjudicate any disputes about the debt. These proofs of claims are
bankruptcy’s alternative mechanism to a separate lawsuit by each creditor to collect a debt. In the
mortgage context, a proof of claim functions similarly to a complaint to foreclose and collect a
deficiency judgment. That is, the claim should establish a creditor’s interest in the debtor’s home
as a mortgagee and the amount owed on the mortgage note. The debtor has the opportunity to
“answer,” by objecting to the claim. The bankruptcy court then has authority to fix the claim.
Because proofs of claim are the most common interaction between debtors and creditors in the

25

Bahchieva, Wachter & Warren, supra note 1, at 104 (finding that bankrupt homeowners are about 50 percent
more likely to file Chapter 13 than Chapter 7 and attributing this preference to Chapter 13’s special protections for
home owners in default.).
26
The median bankruptcy filer reported that they seriously struggled with debts for more than one year before filing
bankruptcy. This query was posed to Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors in telephone interviews one year after the
respondent filed bankruptcy. N=585 (17 missing from total respondent sample of 602). 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy
Project (data on file with author).
27
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
28
Creditors are not required to file proofs of claim. See David Gray Carlson, Proofs of Claim in Bankruptcy: Their
Relevance to Secured Creditors, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 555 (1995).
29
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 709, 712 (1999).
30
11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547.
31
See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAW LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 219 (5th ed.
2005) (“[T]o receive any distribution, each chapter 7 or chapter 13 creditor must submit a proof of claim.”)
32
Practices on paying mortgage creditors in Chapter 13 cases vary. In some jurisdictions, ongoing mortgages are
paid “outside the plan,” meaning that the debtor continues to make the ongoing principal and interest payments
directly to the mortgage servicer without trustee involvement. Even in these jurisdictions, the trustee usually collects
the debtor’s payment of any arrearages on the mortgage loan. In other districts, the trustee collects both the arrearage
amounts and the ongoing mortgage payments. These practices are yet another example of the well-documented
phenomena of “local legal culture” in bankruptcy cases. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and
the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498 (1996); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jaw Lawrence
Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence From the Federal Bankruptcy
Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code,
Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993).
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bankruptcy system,33 they offer an excellent mechanism for examining the behavior of mortgage
servicers in bankruptcy cases.
C. The Harms of Abusive Servicing
Mortgage servicing abuse can take several forms. The Federal Trade Commission
believes that poor servicing can be a serious problem for homeowners and has identified several
abusive practices, including the imposition of unwarranted late fees, unnecessary force-placed
insurance, and illegal fees.34 Two cases illustrate the problems that incorrect or inaccurate
mortgage servicing imposes on borrowers. In Rawlings v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc.,35 the
servicer repeatedly asserted that the homeowners had failed to make payments, imposed late
fees, and sent notices of default. Consumers spent over seven months to resolve the servicers’
error in applying the payments to the wrong account. In another instance, borrowers refinanced
but the prior servicer continued to threaten to foreclose on their home and to report adverse
information to credit bureaus.36 This year, the Boston Globe reported that mortgage companies
typically include projected foreclosure costs in payoff amounts given to borrowers in default.37
These fees are estimates for anticipated services that may never be incurred. While a consumer
advocate described the practice as a “license to steal from homeowners,” an industry
representative conceded that it was “pretty much industry standard.”38
The likelihood that such practices translate to concrete harms is sharpened because
consumers report serious difficulty in communicating with mortgage servicers when they
perceive an error or overcharge has occurred.39 Consumers allege that they have to speak with
dozens of representatives to address servicing mistakes or to receive basic information such as a
payment history. These problems are exacerbated when a borrower defaults on a loan, in part
because the loan is often transferred to the loss mitigation department or sold to a different
servicer who specializes in troubled loans.
Abusive servicing can push a homeowner into default or can make it hard or impossible
for a homeowner to climb out of trouble. Research has shown that the quality of loan servicing
can affect the incidence of loan default.40 Servicers may alter their practices and delay
foreclosure to drive up their profits because they do not have incentives to care about preventing
foreclosure.41 While preventive servicing can reduce loss severities, abusive servicing can
33

While claims are the most common creditor activity in bankruptcy cases, claims are not filed by every creditor.
See 1 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 67.1 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004) (stating that numerous
creditors fail to file proofs of claim).
34
Federal Trade Commission, Mortgage Servicing: Making Sure Your Payments Count, at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/homes/mortgserv.htm.
35
64 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
36
Islam v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D. Mass. 2006).
37
Sacha Pfeiffer, Hidden Legal Fees Push Some Into Foreclosure, BOSTON GLOBE Jan. 18, 2007.
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., S.P. Dinnen, Mortgage Complaints Can Take Extra Effort, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 2, 2004; A.
Pesquera, Paper Trail of Problems: Some Fairbanks Clients Report Nightmare Errors, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Aug. 9, 2002.
40
Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, Loan Servicer Heterogeneity &The Termination of Subprime Mortgages
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2006-024A, 2006, available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-024.pdf (finding that individual servicer affected chance of default to
substantial degree among large sample of subprime mortgages).
41
Yingjin Gan & Christopher Mayer, Agency Conflicts, Asset Substitution, and Securitization (Nat’l. Bur. of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 12359 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12359.
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heighten them.42 Without servicers’ reaching out to consumers and spending the necessary time
and money, sensible loan modification opportunities will be missed. Families who could have
saved their homes with a repayment plan or modification will lose their homes, and investors
will suffer unmitigated losses.43
The harms of servicing abuse may be even higher for families in bankruptcy, who often
file Chapter 13 in a final effort to save their homes. If bankruptcy claims contain illegal fees,
debtors face increased burdens in confirming repayment plans and are forced to find extra
income to make bloated payments. Even if the servicing harm is limited to informational
problems, debtors suffer harms. As one bankruptcy court recognized, mistakes by creditors, who
are in control of the accounts, impose additional costs to sort out such problems on debtors, the
party that can least afford such expense.44 Servicing problems also jeopardize the ability of
courts and trustees to administer bankruptcy cases correctly and fairly. Other creditors are
harmed if mortgage companies wrongly divert money that should be available to pay unsecured
creditors and increase the administrative costs of bankruptcy. If servicing abuse is routine, an
additional harm is to our collective confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy system and the
power of law to balance the rights of consumers and businesses.
D. Litigation on Mortgage Servicing Practices
Mortgage servicing abuse is a nascent legal issue.45 Depending on the type of
misbehavior, consumers may have federal and state claims and both common law and statutory
remedies.46 While the case law is growing, there are still relatively few adjudicated decisions on
mortgage servicing problems. Several explanations exist. Consumers may not be aware of their
rights or be able to afford an attorney. The relative youth of mortgage servicing as an industry
means that few attorneys or judges understand the legal and factual issues. Regulatory authority
for mortgage servicing is fractured. The paucity of decisions suggests that many consumers may
respond to mortgage claims by “lumping it,” rather than seeking any formal redress.47
Consumers who litigate these disputes face all the challenges of typical consumer protection
litigation, including limited access to attorneys, expensive and complicated evidentiary issues,
and insufficient remedies to justify such suits.48
Most litigation against mortgage servicers has occurred in the context of bankruptcy
49
cases. Bankruptcy changes the dynamic between borrowers and servicers. The vast majority of
consumers hire an attorney to represent them in their bankruptcy.50 Without counsel, consumers
42

MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, ET. AL., Preventive Servicing Is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership
Policy, 18 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 243 (2007).
43
Eggert, supra note 21, at 282.
44
Williams v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In re Williams), 2001 WL 1804312, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2001) (awarding
punitive damages to debtor as a result of actions and misrepresentations of creditor).
45
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 11, at 23.
46
Id.
47
Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 14 (1983) (“Even where injuries are
perceived, a common response is resignation, that is, ‘lumping it.’).
48
See JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET. AL., CONSUMER LAW 772 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing barriers to consumer litigation).
49
See Lenders Look for Way, supra note 16, (quoting employee of servicer remarking that “[b]ankruptcy is
becoming a fertile ground for a lot of loopholes and a lot of lawsuits and a lot of costs to servicers”).
50
TERESA SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 22–23 (1989) (finding only 4% of debtors in a sample of 1529
cases filed pro se petitions).
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may be unable to raise such claims. They may also have trouble identifying an attorney who is
familiar with such issues or willing to take such a suit on a stand-alone basis. As part of the
bankruptcy case, the attorney may find it difficult to obtain the cooperation of the mortgage
servicer and litigation may be necessary to fulfill their duty of representation. While bankruptcy
is the context for most servicing disputes, the problems are identified in bankruptcy cases often
originated months or years earlier and are equally likely to occur when a borrower is in default
but does not file bankruptcy.51
Bankruptcy courts have repeatedly expressed frustration with mortgagees’ failure to
provide complete and accurate information.52 Courts and litigants have struggled to obtain
comprehensible records from servicers. In re Maxwell, the court described the creditor’s
pleadings. “Thus, Fairbanks, in February 2000, represented that the Debtor owed it $48,691.36
less than what it demanded of the Debtor in April of 1998 and $192,963.64 more than it
demanded of her on July 13, 1999.”53 The court found that “Fairbanks, in a shocking display of
corporate irresponsibility, repeatedly fabricated the amount of the Debtor’s obligation to it out of
thin air.” The court held that this behavior violated both federal and state law. After the court’s
ruling on liability, the debtor settled the case for a full discharge of her mortgage, $50,000 in
damages, and attorney’s fees.
Other courts have identified a similar pattern of confusing or incomplete recordkeeping
as evidenced by servicers’ proofs of claim. Unable to decipher a servicer’s records, even after
ordering further document production, one court finally resorted to creating its own amortization
table. The judge stated that “[t]he poor quality of papers filed by Fleet to support its claim is a
sad commentary on the record keeping of a large financial institution. Unfortunately, it is typical
of record-keeping products generated by lenders and loan servicers in court proceedings.”54 In
some instances, mortgagees apparently are unable to offer any accounting to support their claim.
In Litton Loan Servicing v. Garvida, when the servicer failed to respond to a court order to
provide information, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed that a downward adjustment of the
mortgagee’s claim was an appropriate remedy.55 Another court reduced a mortgagee’s claim
under the equitable theory of recoupment after finding that the servicer violated the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act in failing to respond to the debtor’s requests for an account balance.
The opinion’s first sentence reveals the court’s frustration: “Is it too much to ask a consumer
mortgage lender to provide the debtor with a clear and unambiguous statement of the debtor’s
default prior to foreclosing on the debtor’s house?”56 In one egregious case, a mortgage company
filed a proof of claim for more than $1 million when the principal balance on the note was
$60,000.57 The inaccuracy stemmed from the claimants’ mistake in reporting the cost of the
51

E-mail from the Honorable Keith M. Lundin (June 9, 2003) (on file with author) (describing session at Nat’l.
Ass’n. of Chapter 13 trustees meeting on mortgage issues in Chapter 13). The grievances aired were: servicers are
unable to prepare correct pre-petition claims in Chapter 13 cases; creditors file proofs of claim without balances or
that are bloated with illegal and fraudulent fees sometimes totaling several thousand dollars; irreconcilable and
unexplained balances appear on amended proofs of claim; servicers provide no contact information; and servicers
refuse to provide loan payment histories.
52
Henry R. Hildebrand III, The Sad State of Mortgage Service Providers, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 10 (2003)
(describing mortgage servicers’ inability or lack of effort to make their records match the debtor’s plan or to comply
with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code such as disclosing fees and costs).
53
Maxwell v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (In re Maxwell), 281 B.R. 101, 114 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002).
54
In re Wines, 239 B.R. 703, 709 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999).
55
In re Garvida, 347 B.R. 697 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2006).
56
In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 842, 844–45 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006).
57
The proof of claim was filed in a Northern District of Texas Chapter 13 case and is on file with the author.
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insurance policy that the servicer forced on the debtor after the debtor’s insurance lapsed. These
problems led a prominent Chapter 13 trustee to conclude that mortgage servicing in bankruptcy
is in a “sorry state.”58
Mortgagee servicing problems have surfaced in other procedural contexts besides proofs
of claims. The nature of this misconduct is rarely due to the posture of the case, however, and
similar problems may infect mortgage claims or non-bankruptcy servicing. For example,
bankruptcy motions for relief from stay put debtors at direct risk of losing their home in a state
law foreclosure action. This context may spur debtors and their attorneys to respond to confront
servicing inaccuracies that went unidentified in proofs of claim. Several courts have complained
about unsubstantiated or patently false allegations in mortgagees’ motions for relief from the
stay. Courts have lamented mortgage servicers’ practice of filing motions to vacate the automatic
stay based on poor accounting practices or non-existent records, rejecting what one court termed
the mortgage servicers’ “dog ate my homework excuses” for such problems.59 These courts have
emphasized two main harms: damage to the judicial process when a court is asked to rule on
incorrect or baseless facts and a danger that a family would lose its home without just cause and
in violation of the Bankruptcy Code.
In Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, the court identified a variety of accounting
errors and impermissible behavior by a mortgage company, including miscalculations of both
prepetition and postpetition obligations and attempts to collect impermissible fees.60 Wells Fargo
also applied payments in violation of the debtor’s confirmed Chapter 13 plan—a practice that
increased the interest charged above what was actually due.61 The court noted that Wells Fargo’s
actions resulted in “such a tangled mess that neither Debtor, who is a certified public accountant,
nor Wells Fargo’s own representative could fully understand or explain the accounting
offered.”62 In another protracted dispute, a court that initially was concerned about whether a
creditor lacked a basis for a motion for relief from stay or may have misapplied plan payments
eventually heard hours of evidence on the propriety of servicers’ and attorneys’ practices in
bankruptcy cases.63 The participation of the U.S. Trustee program in the litigation was hotly
contested,64 but undoubtedly changed the character of the litigation to focus on whether servicers
engage in a pattern of misconduct, an issue usually relevant to crafting an appropriate sanction
for misbehavior.

58

See Hildebrand, supra note 52.
In re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118, 126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
60
In re Jones, No. 03-16518, 2007 WL 1112047 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2007). Perhaps most egregiously, Wells Fargo
charged the debtor for sixteen property inspections during the bankruptcy case but its representative “could not list a
single reason why an inspection would have been ordered postpetition, nor could she detail any reason why
continuous monitoring of the property was necessary or reasonable.” Id. at *11.
61
Id. at *3.
62
Id. at *4. As a remedy, the court imposed a sanction award of $67,202.45 and ordered Wells Fargo to implement
an accurate accounting system for cases in the court’s jurisdiction. Michael L. Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage
(In re Jones), Case. No. 03-16518; Adv. No. 06-01093. Supplemental Memorandum Opinion (Aug. 29, 2007).
63
Order Requiring Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. to Appear and Show Cause Why It Should Not Be Sanctioned
for Filing a Motion for Relief From Stay Containing Inaccurate Debt Figures and Inaccurate Allegations Concerning
Payments Received From the Debtor, In re Parsley, No. 05-90374 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2007).
64
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion of Barrett Burke Wilson Castle Daffin & Frappier, L.L.P. to
Strike or, In the Alternative, Limit Issues and/or Continue Show Cause Hearing, In re Parsley, No. 05-90374 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2007) (finding that U.S. Trustee has standing to participate under 11 U.S.C. § 307 and finding that
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004 permitted requested discovery).
59
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Some courts also have targeted the creditors’ law firms for misbehavior.65 A New Jersey
law firm was fined for filing 250 court pleadings in which the signature page had been presigned before review by the servicer.66 The court’s opinion sternly reminds servicers and
attorneys that technological “advances” do not absolve the responsible humans of their duty to
the court.67 Another court has observed “instances in which attorneys representing alleged
mortgagees or their servicing agents did not know whether the client was a mortgagee or a
servicing agent, or how their client came to acquire its role.”68 In addition, several class-action
lawsuits have been filed based on allegedly inappropriate efforts to collect attorneys’ fees in
bankruptcy.69
When problems are systemic, private lawsuits may be an ineffective solution. The
Federal Trade Commission joined the National Consumer Law Center in bringing a class-action
lawsuit against a large servicer, Fairbanks Capital Corporation, for alleged violations of
consumer protection laws. The lawsuit settled in 2003 after Fairbanks agreed to pay $47 million,
including funding a $5 million foreclosure-redress fund for consumers who lost their homes in
part due to unwarranted charges or difficulties in obtaining information from Fairbanks.70
Despite this victory, the FTC has not pursued any other major enforcement activities against
servicers. The Department of Housing and Urban Development also has authority to address
servicing misbehavior. It enforces the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, which obligates
mortgage servicers to provide certain information to homeowners upon receiving a “qualified
written request.”71 While a failure to respond to a qualified written request can give rise to a
private right of action, there is no empirical evidence on how frequently this law is used to help
consumers.72 Forty percent of consumer complaints to HUD concern servicing issues,73 yet HUD
does not routinely investigate these complaints or collect data from servicers on compliance
issues.
The anecdotal reports of mortgage servicing abuse are growing, and the cited decisions
are quite recent. However, regulatory enforcement remains weak, and cases outside of
bankruptcy are exceedingly rare. Given the millions of consumer who may face foreclosure in
the next few years, and the hundreds of thousands of homeowners who annually file Chapter 13
bankruptcy to save their homes, there is a definite need to probe the reliability of mortgage
65

See, e.g., In re Allen, Memorandum Opinion regarding Sanction of Creditor’s Attorneys, Case No. 06-60121 (Jan.
9, 2007) (finding that large creditor’s firm had filed erroneous and unsubstantiated objection to plan confirmation).
66
In re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006).
67
Id. at 467. See also In re Allen, supra note 65 (describing the close relationship between servicers and their
“outside” counsel, who receive some pleadings “set up” with data from the servicer’s computer system).
68
In re Schwartz, No. 06-42476JBR, 2007 WL 1188348 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2007). In that case, the
“creditor” claimed to have foreclosed before the bankruptcy filing but was ultimately unable to show that it had the
right to undertake any foreclosure activity.
69
See In Re Harris, No. 96-14029-MAM, 00-11321-MAM, Adv. No. 99-1144 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2005); In
Re Slick, No. 98-14378-MAM, Adv. No. 99-1136 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Nov. 22, 2002). In Nevada, a proposed classaction was filed to challenge Ocwen Federal Bank’s practice of including a “proof of claim fee” in claims filed in
Chapter 13 cases. The case was transferred to the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and remains pending. In re
Ocwen Federal Bank FSB Mortgage Servicing Litigation, 04-CV-2714, MDL-1604, N.D. Ill.
70
Fairbanks Capital Corporation settlement documents, http://www.consumerlaw.org/
initiatives/mortgage_servicing/index.shtml.
71
12 U.S.C. § 2605.
72
Consumers themselves or their attorneys (including bankruptcy attorneys) may not be aware of the law. Also
consumers often do not hire attorneys until foreclosure is imminent, at which time a qualified written request and its
sixty-day response window may not be an expedient option.
73
Guttentag, supra note 9.

.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961

Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims

13

servicing. The harms from poor servicing carry severe consequences, and empirical data can help
draw attention to the need to consider how servicing contributes to failed homeownership.
II. METHODOLOGY
The Mortgage Study is a large, multi-state study of the home loans of families in
financial distress. Its principal objective was to create an original database to facilitate new
research on the intersection of mortgage lending and bankruptcy. Tara Twomey74 and I are the
principal investigators in the Mortgage Study, which was funded by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judge’s Endowment for Education.75
The Mortgage Study sample contains 1733 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed by
homeowners. The sample includes cases from forty-four judicial districts in twenty-four states,
which represented 61% of all Chapter 13 cases filed in 2006.76 The sample captures variations in
local bankruptcy practice and ensures that all large mortgage lenders and servicers are
represented. In each district, the sample was constructed by selecting every fifth case filed in
April 2006 in which the debtor owned a home.77 If a case was converted from another chapter or
the debtor did not own a home, that case was excluded and the next case that met the selection
criteria was included in the sample. Thus, the sample roughly reflects the proportional size of
Chapter 13 filings among all judicial districts in the sample.78
The sample is not representative of all homeowners in bankruptcy for two reasons. First,
the sample includes only Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases and excludes Chapter 7 cases. Prior
studies have confirmed that the percentage of homeowners in Chapter 13 bankruptcy is much
higher than in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.79 The exclusive focus on Chapter 13 enhances the data’s
usefulness to examine bankruptcy as a home-saving device.80 Chapter 13 is particularly attractive
to homeowners who are in default on their mortgage loans because it permits them to retain their
home by curing arrearages over time through repayment plans.81 Although the data are only from
74

When the study began, Tara Twomey was a clinical instructor at Harvard Law School. She is currently a Lecturer
in Law at Stanford Law School and a consultant for the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys
and the National Consumer Law Center. Neither organization had any involvement in this research.
75
The Endowment for Education is a non-profit and non-partisan organization. In funding the grant, the Endowment
does not endorse or express any opinion about the methodology utilized, or any conclusions, opinions, or results
contained in this Article or any other findings based on the research funded by the Endowment.
76
American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual Non-business Filings by Chapter (2000-2006),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=47461&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
77
All homeowners were included in the sample, regardless of whether they had mortgages. In the sample, 96% of
homeowners had outstanding mortgage debt when they filed bankruptcy.
78
For example, in a district with few Chapter 13 filings, such as Wyoming, only two cases are in the sample. At the
other extreme, the sample contains 164 cases from the Northern District of Georgia because that district has a large
number of Chapter 13 cases filed.
79
Consumer Bankruptcy Project III (CBP) data indicate that homeownership is much more prevalent among
Chapter 13 debtors than Chapter 7 debtors. In the CBP’s core sample of 1250 cases filed in 2001 in five judicial
districts, 30% of Chapter 7 cases were filed by homeowners. In contrast, 75% of Chapter 13 debtors owned their
homes when they filed bankruptcy (data on file with author).
80
Scarce data exist on how homeowners fare in bankruptcy. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and
Homeownership Risk, 1 ILL. L. REV. 323, 352 (2007) (“Although scholars of mortgage debt and foreclosure
generally may be aware that some homeowners with housing problems file for bankruptcy, chapter 13’s specific
mortgagor protection feature has not received sufficient discrete and sustained scholarly attention.”). The most
extensive study to date was conducted based on cases filed in 2001 and did not rely on proofs of claim or home loan
documents. See Bahchieva, Wachter, & Warren, supra note 1, at 74.
81
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(3) and (b)(5), 1325(a)(5) and 362(a).
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Chapter 13 cases, the rules and procedures to ensure accurate bankruptcy claims are identical for
Chapter 7 cases. However, mortgage claims are much less frequently filed in Chapter 7 cases
because there are fewer homeowners who file Chapter 7 and because Chapter 7 does not offer
the remedies to homeowners in default that Chapter 13 does.
Second, the sample was drawn only from districts where the applicable state law permits
non-judicial foreclosures of debtors’ principal residences.82 We limited the sample in this way
because the more favorable remedies available to mortgagees in non-judicial foreclosure states
may reduce servicers’ incentives to negotiate with consumers after default. That is, because nonjudicial foreclosure is faster and less expensive than judicial foreclosure,83 debtors may have a
greater need to file bankruptcy in non-judicial foreclosures states to contest a foreclosure.
Sampling states that permit non-judicial foreclosure probably boosted the proportion of
homeowners in default on mortgage loans in the sample. Because bankruptcy law is uniform
nationally on the requirements for proofs of claims and the rights of homeowners with mortgages
in default,84 a random national sample (including judicial foreclosure states) may not produce
different data.85
Data were drawn from the public court records filed in each case.86 Like other leading
studies of consumer bankruptcy, 87 we coded data from debtors’ schedules. Filed under penalty
of perjury, these schedules may provide more complete and reliable evidence of debtors’

82

Our sample represents 49% of the judicial districts in the United States. The twenty-four states in the sample are:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
83
GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 635 (2002); BARLOW BURKE, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 336 (2006) (“[Power of sale foreclosure] is cheaper than judicial foreclosure and takes less time.”).
Judicial foreclosure procedures vary depending on state law. Typically these steps include the filing of a lawsuit and
a judgment, followed by a court order authorizing a judicial sale conducted pursuant to statutory procedures. Id. at
334. Non-judicial foreclosure typically proceeds under a deed of trust that permits a third-party trustee, upon default,
to sell the property in a private sale. Although some public notice is required by all states, a non-judicial foreclosure,
as its name suggests, does not require court supervision or the filing of a lawsuit. Id. at 337.
84
Notwithstanding the law’s uniformity, practices in bankruptcy do vary in remarkable ways, often due to “legal
culture.” See generally sources cited in note 32, supra.
85
For those cases in which a foreclosure was filed before bankruptcy, it is possible that in judicial foreclosure states
the lender was more likely to have retained an attorney before the bankruptcy than in non-judicial foreclosure states.
It is unclear if such attorney involvement would result in more complete or accurate bankruptcy pleadings.
86
Most documents were obtained from PACER. We thank the Chief Judges of each district in the Mortgage Study
(with the sole exception noted below) for granting us a research waiver of PACER fees. The Southern District of
Texas denied the application for a fee waiver, stating that it had a blanket policy against such waivers,
notwithstanding the written policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States that individual researchers
associated with educational institutions are eligible for waivers if they can show cause. See Electronic Public Access
Fee Schedules, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2006). When PACER
did not appear to contain complete court files, we obtain paper records. For example, in the Eastern and Middle
Districts of North Carolina, proofs of claim are not made available on PACER. We thank Edward Boltz of the Law
Offices of John T. Orcutt and Reid Wilcox, Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of North Carolina,
for their help in obtaining these documents.
87
Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213 (2006); Scott
Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV.
473 (2006); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of
Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 712 (1999).
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financial situations than survey or interview methods.88 For each case, we coded a debtor’s
income, the debtor’s valuation of her home, and any information about mortgage obligations on
the debtor’s principal residence,89 including total debt, any arrearages, and the amount of
monthly payments.90
The innovation of the Mortgage Study was to code mortgage creditors’ proofs of claim
and supporting documentation. These files give more information on home loans than is
available from debtors’ schedules. Data came from four documents, when available: the proof of
claim itself, an itemization of the amount claimed; a copy of the mortgage that secured the
obligation, and a copy of the note evidencing the debt. From these documents, we coded the type
and terms of each loan; the names of the mortgagee, originating lender, and servicer; the amount
of the initial mortgage debt; and the amount of mortgage debt, including arrearages, when the
bankruptcy was filed. We also coded any objections to mortgage creditors’ proofs of claim and
any amended claims. For a case with only one mortgage loan, we coded 152 data points; when
debtors had more loans, there were more data points to capture.91 Combining data from creditors’
and debtors’ pleadings, the Mortgage Study database offers a rich and detailed picture of
bankrupt families’ mortgages.
Data were coded into a specially designed database. We deployed several standard
procedures to ensure the data’s accuracy. First, if the initial coding six months after the cases’
filing did not locate a mortgagee proof of claim or an objection to any filed proof of claim, we
rechecked the court records a year later to locate any records that were filed later or missed in the
initial coding. These were added to the database. To reduced concerns about coding reliability,
we used only three coders, each of which either had law degrees or prior experience on academic
bankruptcy projects. All coders received individual training on practice cases to develop
consistent coding practices. Coders referred to a written manual while coding and noted any
unusual situations or questions. We individually reviewed the coding in each of these flagged
cases. We also performed two types of error checks on the data. First, we ran error traps to
improve the accuracy of the database,92 and corrected any identified errors. Second, a random
sample of 10% of the cases (approximately 175 cases) was recoded blind, without reference to
the prior coding. We then compared each variable of each case between the initial coding and the
recoding, noted any discrepancies, and checked for mistakes in the initial coding. The data were
99% accurate, and no systematic errors were identified between coders.93
88

RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 61 (2006) (noting problems with the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finance data); David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for
Consumer Behavior? Evidence From Credit Card Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 151, n.2 (2001) (“SCF households
substantially underreport their bankcard debt.”).
89
Real property that was not the debtor’s principal residence was ignored, as were any corresponding proofs of
claim for such properties. No debtor was permitted to have more than one principal residence.
90
We coded data from the docket, petition, Schedules A, C, D, I, and J, Form B22, and the Chapter 13 plan. These
documents were available and complete in over 99% of sampled cases; there are very few missing observations. We
coded only the original version of the schedules, including any separately or later-filed schedules that were not
included in the original schedules. We did not code amendments to schedules because we were interested in the
debtors’ initial abilities to gauge the amounts of their mortgage debts.
91
The exact number of data points actually coded varied with each case based on several factors, including the
number of home loans, the type of loan, and the quantity of documentation attached to the proof of claim.
92
Two examples illustrate this type of check: we reviewed any proof of claim dates before April 2006 when the
cases were filed; we checked for any dollar figures that began with a decimal point or exceeded one million dollars.
93
The error rate was 1.04%. To calculate the error rate, we compared the original coding and the recoding and
determined the number of errors in the initial coding, and divided this number by the number of data points.
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The final data were transferred to Microsoft Excel and SPSS for Windows for analysis.
All dollar figures are presented as reported in court records without adjustment for inflation.
III. FINDINGS
The Mortgage Study data permit multiple analyses of the reliability of mortgage claims.
The overall pattern of findings is disturbing. Many creditors do not comply with applicable law
governing claims. Routinely, fees are not identified with specificity, making it impossible to
determine if these charges are legal. In most instances, mortgagees believe the debt is greater
than debtors do; these differences typically represent thousands of dollars. Yet, creditors are
rarely called to task for these behaviors. The vast majority of all claims (96%) pass undisturbed
through the bankruptcy system without objection. Attorneys do not aggressively enforce their
clients’ rights against mortgage companies because the costs are too high and the incentives are
too low in the current system. The combination of widespread deficiencies in claims and the lack
of objections weakens the integrity of the bankruptcy process and can harm both debtors and
other creditors by skewing distributions in favor of mortgage creditors.
A. Required Documentation for Mortgage Claims
Mortgage creditors who want to receive distributions from the bankruptcy estate for
mortgage arrearages must file a proof of claim. Claims also establish the amount of the debtor’s
future mortgage payment during the bankruptcy case. In the Chapter 13 cases in the sample,
mortgage creditors filed proofs of claim to correspond with 81.7% of the home loans that debtors
listed on their bankruptcy schedules.94
Creditors who file claims are required to use Official Form 10 or a similar document that
substantially conforms to the form.95 Form 10 directs creditors to attach an itemized statement if
their claim “includes interest or other charges” in addition to the principal amount.96 This
requirement would apply to nearly all typical mortgage claims, as these obligations bear interest.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001 imposes two additional evidentiary requirements on
proofs of claim:97 a copy of the writing if one evidences the claim;98 and evidence of perfection
if the creditor asserts a security interest in the property of the debtor. 99
Requiring this trio of documentation (itemization, note and mortgage) permits all parties
in a bankruptcy case—debtor, trustee, other creditors—to ensure the accuracy and legality of the
claim. Without documentation, parties cannot verify that the claim is correctly calculated and
that it reflects only amounts due under the terms of the note and mortgage and permitted by other

94

As noted in Part II (Methodology), supra, we checked at two points (six months after each case’s filing date and
over one year after the cases’ filing date) to ensure the completeness of the proof of claim data. See also text near
notes 28─33, supra, for mortgagees’ incentives to file claims.
95
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(a).
96
Official Form 10, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/bankform/formb10new.pdf.
97
It is possible that a single integrated document could perform the function of both the note and the mortgage in
creating the parties’ rights and obligations in the transaction. We did not identify such instances in the sample.
Because consumer home loans are typically intended for sale on the secondary market, separation of the note and the
mortgage helps ensure that the note is a negotiable instrument that will be subject to the holder-in-due-course
defense upon transfer.
98
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c) (“When a claim, or an interest in property of the debtor securing the claim, is based on a
writing, the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the proof of claim.”).
99
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(d) (“If a security interest in property of the debtor is claimed, the proof of claim shall be
accompanied by evidence that the security interest has been perfected.”).
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applicable law.100 A lack of documentation hampers efforts to ensure that any payments on
mortgage claims are made in accord with the Bankruptcy Code.
The documentation requirements for mortgage proofs of claim are unambiguous and
long-standing. Nevertheless, these laws were not consistently respected. A majority of claims
(52.77%) lacked one or more required attachments. Figure 1 illustrates the findings for
mortgagees’ proofs of claim on loans secured by a debtor’s home.101 The data show that in a
majority of instances mortgagees to not provide the required documentation.
Figure 1: Percent of Proofs of Claim Missing Required Documentation
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A majority of claims (83.9%) had the itemization attached to them. Despite the
applicable, clear instruction on Form 10, the remaining fraction (16.1%) did not have any
itemization attached. For the one in six claims that was not supported by an itemization, the
debtor and other parties are unable to discern the specific bases for a creditor’s asserted right to
be paid the total amount of the claim. Further, as discussed in Part B, infra, the usefulness of
these itemizations varied greatly.
The most fundamental piece of evidence to support a claim is a copy of the promissory
note or instrument establishing the existence and terms of the debt. A note is necessary to
establish the existence of a debt, its key terms, and the creditor’s standing to collect the debt.
Despite its importance, a note was not attached to 41.1% of claims.
The finding that four of ten claims were not supported by a note is troubling for several
reasons. First, the note is not easily available from another source. Unlike mortgages, notes are
not recorded in public records. If the debtor does not have a copy of the note, and the servicer
100

For example, some states have specific laws that govern foreclosure costs and fees. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. 600.2431 (West 2000) (capping attorneys’ fees in a non-judicial foreclosure at no more than $75 if the
mortgage does not specifically contract for such attorneys’ fees).
101
These data come from the proof of claim initially filed in each case and do not reflect any attachments that may
have been added if mortgagees filed amended claims. The purpose here is to measure compliance with the clear
obligations of the rules in the first instance, not whether creditors responded if a party objected or requested
information.
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does not provide one, the servicer has an informational advantage, which the rule was
presumably designed to eliminate. Next, the promissory note or other debt instrument is
absolutely necessary to enable the debtor, trustee, and other creditors to verify that the amount
asserted to be owed on the proof of claim is correct. The note contains the initial account
balance, the applicable interest rate, and the terms that govern the mortgagee’s ability to charge
fees upon default.102 In subprime loans, such terms are non-standard and may vary widely,
increasing the importance of having a copy of the note. Finally, Rule 3001(c)’s requirement that
a copy of a writing be attached applies widely. Nearly all debts are evidenced by writing in
today’s commercial economy. Yet, even when the claim is for a large debt such as a mortgage,
creditors do not comply with the proof of claim rules. The mortgage data hint that compliance
with Rule 3001(c) may be even worse for smaller claims evidenced by a writing, such as creditcard debts.103
Creditors were more diligent about attaching documentation to prove a valid security
interest in the debtor’s home. A perfected security interest such as a copy of a recorded mortgage
or deed of trust accompanied 80.4% of mortgagees’ proofs of claim. As shown in Figure 1,
19.6% of claims were not supported by a security interest to document the creditor’s lien in the
debtor’s home. In light of the dismal compliance on attachment of notes, it may be tempting to
view the security interest data as a relative success that may not merit policy attention. However,
several risks are created when creditors do not prove a valid security interest.
The first potential harm is to the integrity of the bankruptcy system. The data show that
nearly one in five mortgagees ignores a clear disclosure rule when they participate in a
bankruptcy case. With much less evidence of misbehavior by debtors,104 Congress imposed
audits on debtors’ schedules to ensure full disclosure of assets and permitted dismissal of
debtors’ cases as a penalty for failing to provide documentation.105 These laws evidence
Congress’ belief that bankruptcy is a serious and important process and that full disclosure is
necessary to preserve the system’s integrity. Creditors who make affirmative filings to a court,
such as a proof of claim, also affect public confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy

102

In most instances, the note contains broad language on charges and costs. For example, the Fannie Mae uniform
instrument gives the note holder a “right to be paid back by [the borrower] for all of its costs and expenses in
enforcing this Note to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable
attorneys’ fees.” See Fannie Mae, Multistate Fixed Rate Note—Single Family, 6e,
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/notes/pdf/3200.pdf. Even under this broad language, debtors
may have challenges to the mortgagees’ claim. For example, they could contest the “reasonableness” of asserted
attorneys’ fees or argue that the language on “costs and expenses” is modified by “enforcing this Note” so that costs
such as fax fees cannot be justified by this provision.
103
John Rao, Debt Buyers Rewriting of Rule 3001: Taking the “Proof” Out of the Claims Process, 23 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 16 (July/Aug. 2004).
104
See Steven W. Rhodes, A Preview of “Demonstrating a Serious Problem with Undisclosed Assets in Chapter 7
Cases”, 5 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1 (May 2002) (finding in a one district sample that 41% of asset cases—a
small fraction of all Chapter 7 cases generally—contained inaccuracies in debtors’ lists of assets and valuations);
Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, REPORT OF THE
NAT’L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, ch. 5, at 14. (“The Commission repeatedly heard testimony that the
information reported in the debtors’ schedules is unreliable.”).
105
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter “BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 603,
119 Stat. 23, 122 (authorizing random audits of debtors); Pub. L. No. 109-8, §316, 119 Stat. 23, 92 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 521(i)) (Supp. V. 2005) (automatically dismissing bankruptcy case if debtor does not provide required
information, such as payment advices).
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system.106 The failure of approximately twenty percent of creditors to attach security interests to
their claims damages the structural integrity of the process to ensure that claims are accurate and
all assets are distributed according to bankruptcy law and procedure.
The second reason that the finding on attachment of mortgages is troubling results from
the serious distributional consequences to all parties in a bankruptcy if a mortgagee cannot prove
it holds a valid security interest. Under bankruptcy law, a mortgage that is not properly perfected
can be avoided.107 Avoidance typically relegates the obligation to unsecured status in bankruptcy
and dramatically reduces the debtor’s obligation to pay the full amount of the debt.108 Even a
credible threat of avoidance can cause an allegedly secured party to lower its claim to prevent
litigation risk of its secured status. Thus, the ability to challenge whether a mortgage is properly
perfected redounds to the benefit of both the debtor and to all unsecured creditors, whose
distributions from the bankruptcy estate will be higher if the mortgage is not entitled to treatment
as a secured claim. In light of these very powerful benefits, the rate of non-compliance is
alarming. The failure to attach a security interest should serve as a red flag that prompts scrutiny
of the claim. While some trustees or debtors may themselves be checking the public records to
determine if the creditor holds a valid mortgage, this state of affairs effectively reflects creditors’
ability to shift the burdens of their disclosure duties on to other parties in the system. The law
requires creditors to prove that they are entitled to preferential treatment as secured creditors;
their failure to do so creates a risk that some creditors who may not in fact have valid mortgages
will receive higher payments than those to which the law entitles them.109
Finally, the security interest is necessary for the same reasons as the note: it contains the
terms that bear on the calculation of the amount owed. Further, the mortgage usually contains
provisions on how a loan should be serviced. For example, the model Fannie Mae instrument
requires the lender to either apply or refund partial payments within a “reasonable period of
time.”110 Based on this language, a debtor could challenge a servicer’s practice of holding
payments in suspense accounts for extended periods.
Mortgagees’ compliance with the documentation requirements for claim varied among
judicial districts. Figure 2 shows the variation among districts for the three types of claims
documentation.111 The boxes in Figure 2 demarcate the middle two quartiles of documentation
106

Because debtors almost always affirmatively seek bankruptcy relief, it may be fair to impose increased burdens
for disclosure on them as the “moving party.” Nonetheless, creditors who participate in cases also submit themselves
to federal process and should be required to comport with the rules that govern their actions in bankruptcy cases.
107
11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548. These provisions are commonly called the “strong arm” powers, because they empower
the trustee or other party in interest to “knock off” security interests that are not properly perfected under state law to
defeat certain other types of creditors.
108
Without a security interest, the mortgage is an unsecured obligation and the house is owned free and clear. This
not only frees up the house as an asset for the debtor to borrow against in the future, it permits the debtor to
discharge any remaining obligation on the mortgage claim after committing all disposable income for the applicable
commitment period in the Chapter 13 case.
109
In addition to failure to have properly perfected the mortgage by complying with state recording statutes, some
trustees who routinely demand and scrutinize mortgage documents have identified other errors that invalidate a
mortgage (such as the failure for a notary to witness the mortgage, for example).
110
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument (standard), available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments/#standard.
111
The top and bottom of the lines in Figure 2 show that there was at least one district in which no claims (0%) had
a required type of documentation and at least one district in which all claims (100%) had a required type of
documentation. These findings largely result from the presence of some districts in the sample with very few cases.
Because the addition of a single case could dramatically change the compliance rate, the absolute range of
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compliance. The bottom of each box shows the percent of attached documentation in the district
that was at the first quartile (25% of districts had worse compliance). The top of each box shows
the percent of attached documentation in the district that was at the top quartile (75% of districts
had worse compliance). The diamond in the middle of each box shows the rate of attached
documentation in the median district.
The relatively small height of the boxes in Figure 2 indicates that most jurisdictions do
not approach full compliance with documentation requirements. The overall pattern of findings
is not driven by outlying districts with very poor compliance. Even in the districts that boast
compliance that is better than the other three quartiles of districts, the fraction of claims without
documentation is significant. The problem is particularly acute with respect to mortgagees’
failure to attach notes. Among the districts with the worst compliance (those in the bottom
quartile), the percentage of claims with a note attached was 50 percent or below, ranging all the
way to zero complying claims. In these jurisdictions, a majority of claims will not be supported
by a copy of the note.
Figure 2: Variation among Judicial Districts in Attached Documentation
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The variation among districts reinforces concerns about uniformity, a feature of
bankruptcy law that is explicit in the U.S. Constitution’s bankruptcy clause.112 While uniformity
challenges to bankruptcy law have had little success,113 the variations in claims documentation
reveal systematic differences based on where a debtor files bankruptcy. While the law is
identical, the realities of compliance vary among judicial districts. Proofs of claim are another
example of a “local legal culture” effect in bankruptcy.114 To the extent that uniformity is crucial
to ensure the integrity of the bankruptcy system, creditors’ inconsistent compliance with claims
compliance is not very useful. Thus, the data on inter-district variation are best used to observe a general pattern as
shown by the quartile findings.
112
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 592–94 (2005).
113
See id. (cataloguing unsuccessful challenges under the uniformity clause).
114
See sources cited in note 32, supra (describing other examples of local legal culture phenomenon in bankruptcy).
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procedures is troubling. Depending on place of residence, debtors and their counsel receive
varying amounts of information about mortgage obligations.
The data on proofs of claim show that in at least one important respect creditor behavior
is not uniform, and that the reality of practice does not match the clear requirements of the law.
Despite long-standing and unambiguous documentation rules that apply in all bankruptcy cases,
most mortgage proofs of claim lack one or more pieces of documentation. This pattern of
noncompliance undermines the purpose of the proof of claim rules and effectively shifts the
burden to debtors or trustees to verify the accuracy of claims. Undocumented or insufficiently
documented claims create obstacles to ensuring that mortgage creditors are paid in accordance
with the law. At worst, creditors’ failure to provide documentation can manipulate the
bankruptcy system to overpay on these obligations, harming the debtor and all other creditors.115
The requirements for claims documentation should be consistently respected and enforced to
prevent these harms.
B. Default Fees in Mortgage Claims
Itemizations were the most common documentation attached to claims. The prevalence of
itemizations, however, is a misleading cue as to their usefulness in ensuring the accuracy of
mortgage claims. Two major problems undermined the itemizations as a tool to evaluate the
propriety of a creditor’s claim. First, there is no standard form for itemizations. Even among a
single servicer or attorney, the itemization format and amount of detail varied.116 Without a
standard format, itemizations cannot be reviewed using a semi-automated or routine process. In
high-volume system such as consumer bankruptcy, the result is to dramatically limit the scrutiny
of claims. For a debtor to afford a bankruptcy, the consumer attorney has to employ standardized
procedures that can be applied in hundreds of cases a year. Trustees are similarly bound by cost
and efficiency concerns. The wide variation in the form of itemizations means that debtors and
trustees will be severely hampered in reviewing and objecting to claims. The result is a system
that does not ensure that even obvious mistakes or overcharges in claims will be reviewed and
objections filed, if appropriate.
The second, and related, problem is tremendous variation in the quantity of detail
provided on itemizations. Some “itemizations” contain so little detail as to be a perversion of the
proof of claim form’s use of that term to describe the attachment. In a few instances, the
itemization simply consisted of a break-out of the amount of arrears that was part of the
creditor’s total claim. Since the proof of claim form itself already requires that information, the
itemization added nothing to the one-page claim form itself. Other creditors merely listed three
categories: the total amounts of principal, interest, and “other/miscellaneous.”
To analyze the variation in detail, the Mortgage Study coded all the itemization detail
into several categories based on the types of charges that debtors allegedly owe.117 Despite using
115

See Opinion Resolving Show Cause Order Entered on March 8, 2007, In re Wingerter, No. 06-50120 (Oct. 1,
2007) (“A policy of filing a proof of claim without having possession of the supporting documents, but withdrawing
the claim if the debtor subsequently files an objection to the claim’s validity smacks of gamesmanship and creates
an unacceptable risk that distributions to other creditors will be unfairly reduced.”).
116
In some districts, the variation was obviously due to the differing practices of the attorney hired to represent the
servicer. In other instances, however, the same attorney filed proofs of claim in several different formats, probably
reflecting the fact that the servicer itself is preparing the proof of claim and merely transmitting it to the attorney for
review and filing with the court.
117
Each charge was categorized as one of the following: principal, interest, escrow, late charges, foreclosure fees or
costs, non-sufficient funds charges, property inspection fees, broker price opinions or appraisals, corporate
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the servicing industry’s own categories,118 43% of itemizations either made reference to fees that
did not fit one of the dozen specific categories or proffered an aggregate sum of many types of
varying charges that could not be separated. One common technique was the use of a temporal
category that did not provide any legal basis for the permissibility of the charges. For example,
several itemizations labeled charges only as “pre-petition,” without identification of whether
these amounts resulted from missed payments, default charges, or accrued interest.119 Among
claims with debt identified only as “pre-petition,” the average of this type of debt was $1651, a
fairly substantial sum without any specific basis. Another common label was “prior/previous
servicer,” which again does not pinpoint the basis for the charges or permit any examination of
whether the amount claimed is correct. Perhaps most egregiously, some amounts were labeled
merely “other” or included in a column of summed figures with absolutely no description at
all.120 These vague or temporal descriptions do not meet the requirement of Form 10 to “detail”
any additional charges and do not permit meaningful review of the accuracy or legality of the
servicer’s calculation of the debt.
The itemizations were plagued another troubling feature: the use of laundry-list
descriptions. The most common such label in the sample was “Inspection, Appraisal, NSF, and
other charges.” Over thirty proofs of claim used that recitation (with the words in that order and
no additional breakdown of fees in that line item). For this description to be literally accurate, the
servicer should have actually conducted an inspection and an appraisal, one or more of the
debtor’s payments should have been returned for non-sufficient funds, and the debtor should
have engaged in some other behavior that resulted in a permissible charge. While plausible, the
laundry-list description with its inclusion of “other charges” suggests that servicers are taking
shortcuts in describing the actual fees that debtors owe.
The poor quality of itemizations has real harms. First, confidence in the bankruptcy
system is undermined when the quality of information provided does not satisfy the rules
designed to ensure fair claims distribution. Vague or laundry-list descriptions do not satisfy the
instructions on the proof of claim form, which were written to balance the rights and needs of
debtors and creditors. Second, without a true itemization that identifies the nature of each fee,
parties cannot verify that a mortgage claim is correctly calculated. The service could have made
a mistake when aggregating fees and charges. Alternatively, the servicer could be overreaching
and charging fees that are not permitted by law or the terms of the contract. The case law
described in Part I, infra, shows that when courts scrutinize the nature of mortgage claims, they
frequently find evidence of servicer misbehavior. Yet, the itemizations do not provide sufficient
information to permit a review of the charges’ legality. Individual debtors would need to engage
in extensive discovery to verify the permissibility of the servicer’s calculations. This reality
makes it equally impossible to use the Mortgage Study data to apply systematic analyses to
determine if servicers are actually charging illegal fees. The available bankruptcy court records
advances, post-petition fees, suspense funds, or other. The last category was residual and used when the charge did
not fit another category or the fees were not broken out into one of the above categories.
118
The categories set forth in note 117, supra, are consistent with those on the Model Proof of Claim itemization
developed by a joint committee of Chapter 13 trustees and mortgage servicers. See Model Proof of Claim
Attachment, NAT’L ASS’N OF CHAPTER THIRTEEN TRUSTEES, REPORT OF MORTGAGE COMMITTEE (June 28, 2007)
(on file with author).
119
Charges or amounts labeled merely as pre-petition were identified in 63 claims, fewer than 5% of all claims. This
count excludes any fees labeled pre-petition attorneys’ fees.
120
For example, one claim’s “itemization” listed $5391 described only as “other.” CDCA 12. Another claim
requested $3023 for “delinquency expenses.” NDGA 146.
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simply do not provide the necessary information. Indeed, the courts that have adjudicated
disputes over mortgage claims have needed dozens of hours of evidentiary testimony to decipher
the basis for the total amount claimed by mortgage servicers. This, in fact, is the key point. By
obscuring the information needed to determine the alleged basis for the charges, servicers thwart
effective review of mortgage claims. The system can only function as intended if complete and
appropriate disclosures are made.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the servicers’ itemizations, I attempted to conduct an
individual review of claims that were merely categorized as “other.” Given that the categories
used to code the claims data (e.g., “foreclosure costs”) were deliberately broad to encompass all
likely charges, these charges seemed per se suspicious. I identified dozens and dozens of claimed
fees that appeared to be impermissible, or at minimum, should have been challenged to ensure
that the creditor had a basis for such unusual charges. Table 1 gives a few examples of causes for
concern.
Table 1: Actual Fees from Mortgagees’ Claims
Description

Id. No.

Fee amount

Attorney’s fees

WDVA 4

$31,273

Bankruptcy fees
& costs

NDGA 56

$2275

Broker price
opinion fee
Demand fee
Overnight
delivery
Payoff statement
fee
Fax fee

ED AR 18

$1489

DMA 18
EDMI 91

$145
$137

SDCA 7

$60

EDVA 21

$50

The law constrains the charges that debtors must pay in several ways. On their face, the fees in
Table 1 appear vulnerable to legal challenge. Yet, none of these claims were objected to by any
party in the bankruptcy. The law’s various limits on fees were never invoked to test the validity
of these charges.
The first legal constrain on fees and charges is private contract law. The note and
mortgage themselves are agreements that limit the parties’ obligations.121 Most mortgage notes
only obligate the borrower to pay the lender for “reasonable” costs incurred to collect on the debt
or enforce the security interest.122 The standard mortgage permits the lender, upon default
(including a bankruptcy filing) to “do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate” to
protect the lender’s interest in the property and rights under the security agreement.123 While this
121

This point reinforces the problems created when claims are not supported by this documentation, particularly for
subprime loans, which do not conform to Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac standards.
122
For example, one of the mortgages MDTN 44 contains the following language: “COSTS OF COLLECTION
AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES—I agree to pay you all reasonable costs you incur to collect this debt or realize on any
security. This includes, unless prohibited by law, reasonable attorneys’ fees.”
123
See Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument (standard), available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments/#standard (“If [Borrower defaults including
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language is quite broad, it is not unlimited. For example, at least one court has held that payoff
fees are impermissible because they constitute a non-reimbursable expense under the terms of
the note.124 The typical amount of a fax fee ($50) could also be challenged as unreasonable. Such
requests are apparently handled automatically by fax-back technology at minimal cost to the
servicer.125 Thus, some of the fees shown in Table 1 may be neither reasonable nor permitted by
contract. Paying such claims would distort the claims distribution process and impose unfair
burdens on debtors in making bankruptcy payments.
State or federal statutes also limit the fees that debtors must pay. Certain charges appear
on proofs of claim simply are not legal. Some states prohibit the pyramiding of late fees126 or
have promulgated specific rules about the use of suspense accounts to hold partial payments in
abeyance.127 Because mortgage servicers operate on a national basis, they may be unaware of
these state laws. Alternatively, servicers may apply the same fees to all loans covered by a
securitization agreement, despite the fact that varying state law actually applies. The propriety of
fees may be impossible to verify without a payment history for the loan, which almost never was
attached to the proof of claim.128 For example, the payment history may show that the servicer
imposed late charges on the homeowner, despite the homeowner’s check clearing the bank
before the payment was due,129 or that the servicer held funds in “suspense accounts” without
application to the amount due.130
Some servicing practices may constitute consumer abuse. For example, the Federal Trade
Commission alleged that Fairbanks Capital Corporation had engaged in an unfair or deceptive
practice by repeatedly and unnecessarily assessing property preservation fees, which usually
by filing bankruptcy], then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s
interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of
the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property. Lender’s actions can include, but are not limited to:
(a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and
(c) paying reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security
Instrument, including its secured position in a bankruptcy proceeding.”).
124
See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-3(4) (prohibiting payoff fee or limiting fee to $10 if borrower requests a faxed
copy of payoff amount or has other recent payoff requests); Dougherty v. N. Fork Bank, 753 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003) (holding that payoff quote fee of $100 was not permissible under state law).
125
See Michael LaCour-Little, The Evolving Role of Technology in Mortgage Finance, 11 J. OF HOUSING RESEARCH
173, 192 (2000) (“Payoff requests can be handled by incorporating the related fax-back technology, in which printed
payoff statements (as would be required for a refinance loan) can be automatically faxed back to a telephone number
entered during the same automated telephone transaction.”).
126
The Fannie Mae note seems to prohibit pyramiding late fees, stating that the borrower will pay a late charge
“only once on each late payment.” See Fannie Mae, Multistate Fixed Rate Note—Single Family, 6a, available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/notes/pdf/3200.pdf. Some transactions used different notes
(and thus, it is important that a copy of the note accompany the proof of claim), and some servicers may not honor
the terms of the notes, either intentionally or inadvertently.
127
JOHN RAO, ODETTE WILLIAMSON & TARA TWOMEY, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES:
DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING 154–55 (2d. ed. 2007).
128
The instruction on the proof of claim form says that the claimant “must attach to this proof of claim form copies
of documents that show the debtor owes the debt claimed.” This arguably requires not just the note to show the
existence of the original debt, but a current payment history that supports that the debtor actually owes the amount
of the claim.
129
See In re Ocwen Fed. Bank F.S.B. Mortgage Servicing, 2006 WL 794739 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) (denying
motion to dismiss a multi-district litigation suit that alleged, inter alia, that servicer misapplied payments and
improperly imposed late fees).
130
Most loan instruments specify how payments are to be applied, and a violations of this language is a potential
breach of contract.
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means an agent drove by the property to determine its condition. The settlement enjoined the
assessment of such fees more frequently than every thirty days and permitted such charges only
if Fairbanks was unable to contact the borrower or had determined that the property was
vacant.131 Recently, one bankruptcy court stated that it was “done allowing lenders
reimbursement for property preservation fees,” unless the lenders can show “that those property
inspections actually happened and that they’re worthwhile.”132 If the fees cannot meet these
criteria, they may not legally be charged. Imposing such fees could give rise to a counterclaim
against the servicer for engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice. The amount of the property
preservation fees in the sampled itemizations varied greatly, suggesting either that many of these
fees resulted from multiple inspections or that a few servicers may be charging an unreasonable
amount for a single inspection service.133 The “broker price opinion” charge in Table 1 would
grossly exceed the standard cost for this type of property inspection, which is essentially an
abbreviated appraisal. If the $1489 sum represents several inspections, the servicer should have
separated these charges in its detail of fees.
Another limitation on charges is found in the general law of contracts. Even if the parties’
agreement does not contain a “reasonableness” requirement for default fees, egregious charges
could be challenged as unconscionable as a matter of contract law. For example, the overnight
delivery charge of $137 in Table 1 may meet this standard. A court could rule that this charge
violated public policy. It is quite possible, of course, that the $137 represents the sum of many
charges, rather than one mailing. Alternatively, perhaps it reflects a data entry error and should
have been $13, or $17, or $37. The crucial problem is that the bankruptcy system did not flag
this item as a potential cause for concern and seek to determine if this charge was legally
permissible.
Federal bankruptcy law imposes additional legal constraints on the charges that debtors
must pay their mortgage companies. Many claims in the sample included a flat “bankruptcy fee”
in the proof of claim.134 The propriety of this practice is unclear. Some courts have held that, to
the extent these fees are for creditors’ attorneys’ fees, it is impermissible to include them in a
claim.135 Instead, creditors must file a fee application pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2016.136 Other courts have reached a contrary conclusion and permitted attorneys’
fees in claims.137 Some courts have modified this approach, requiring that the disclosure of the

131

Order Preliminarily Approving Stipulated Final Judgment and Order as to Fairbanks Capital and Fairbanks
Capital Holding Corp., United States v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 03-12219 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 2003), available
at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/11/0323014order.pdf.
132
Transcript of Hearing at 3, In re Waring, No. 06-40614 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 27, 2007).
133
In addition to the example given in Table 1, two different proofs of claim requested payment of property
preservation fees of $105, NDTX 69, NDTX 75; another property preservation fee was $240, SDGA 56. As
discussed in the text accompanying notes 143–144, inspection and appraisal were frequently combined in a laundry
list of fees, making it impossible to determine whether the inspection or appraisal parts of these charges were
reasonable.
134
In the remainder of this Section, I use the term “bankruptcy fee” as shorthand to describe these fees. I did not
include any fees that were identified as related to actual post-petition litigation, such as a motion for relief from the
stay or an objection to confirmation.
135
See, e.g., Tate v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp., 253 B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2000) (ruling that creditor
cannot “hide” attorneys’ fees for preparing a proof of claim in the claim itself without court approval).
136
Id. at 665; In re Ezzell, 07-34780 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2008) (disallowing attorneys fees for failure to
comply with Rule 2016).
137
See, e.g., In re Atwood, 293 B.R. 227, 232 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003).
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attorneys fees be “specific”138 or ruling that while including fees is prima facie permissible, a fee
application will be required if the debtor objects to the fees.139 These inconsistent rulings make it
more difficult for both servicers and attorneys to know how to handle these charges in preparing
a bankruptcy claim.
The amounts of attorneys fee disclosed in the claims varied considerably. The data
revealed several clusters of bankruptcy fees; the most common amounts were $125, $150, $250,
$275, and $500. On a dollar basis, the difference in these amounts is small. On a percentage
basis, however, many mortgagees charge two or three times as much as other mortgagees.140
Because the fees varied within judicial districts, the discrepancy does not seem to be attributable
merely to regional cost differences.141 The consistency of such fees also suggests that many
servicers use a flat fee, rather than a lodestar method based on hourly rate, which is required in
some jurisdictions. Given the non-existent or minimal scrutiny of most mortgage claims,142 the
system appears to permit mortgagees to effectively make their own determinations of what
constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees for a routine Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
A related problem is that one cannot discern from a flat bankruptcy fee whether such
charges actually represent an actual expense for attorneys. Some creditors use such a bankruptcy
fee to collect a “monitoring” fee due to the purported additional burden of having to service a
loan in bankruptcy.143 In other instances, servicers may seek to impose a bankruptcy fee for the
purported administrative costs of preparing a proof of claim.144 If such work is performed by
internal employees and not by licensed attorneys, the corresponding fee cannot be claimed under
the “reasonable attorneys’ fees” provision of the security agreement or note. Arguably such
expenses are mere costs of servicing a mortgage that the servicer was previously compensated
for by the owners of the note.145 Without better disclosure, bankruptcy courts cannot even ensure
that creditors are respecting the bankruptcy law that governs attorneys’ fees.
138

In re Madison, 337 B.R. 99, 103–04 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2006); see also In re Powe, 281 B.R. 336, 347 (Bankr.
S.D. Ala. 2001).
139
In re Plant, 288 B.R. 635, 644 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003).
140
A review of the data suggests that in May 2006, when the claims in the Mortgage Study were filed, the
bankruptcy fee of Bank of America was $250. Yet, Chase Home Finance, LLC imposed a bankruptcy fee of half
that amount, $125. These lenders are large, national institutions, and presumably their actual costs for preparing a
proof of claim would be quite similar. Nevertheless, the data show a disparity. It appears that debtors whose
mortgage is held by Bank of America must pay $125 more than debtors whose mortgage is held by Chase Home
Finance, LLC in order to complete their plan.
141
For example, in the Eastern District of Arkansas, bankruptcy fees ranged from $125 to $800.
142
See infra Part III.D.
143
The lodestar versus flat fee issue was apparently a point of contention in the work of the National Association of
Chapter 13 Trustees’ committee on proofs of claim. The servicers wrote separately on this issue to argue that a flat
fee should be permissible, analogizing to the flat “no-look” fee that some courts permit for Chapter 13
representation to avoid debtors’ counsel having to file a fee application pursuant to Rule 2016 in each case. See
Notes by Mortgage Servicers on Mortgage Servicing during a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy at 3–4, Appendix to NAT’L
ASS’N OF CHAPTER THIRTEEN TRUSTEES, REPORT OF MORTGAGE COMMITTEE (June 28, 2007) (on file with author).
144
This may be particularly true when the charge was described as “POC prep fee” or “plan review” fee. Neither of
the prior-quoted activities is strictly necessary to “defend the mortgage,” nor are they costs from “prosecut[ing] all
necessary claims and actions to prevent or recover for any damage to or destruction of the property.” Further, the
preparation or filing of a proof of claim and the review of a proposed Chapter 13 plan may not constitute an
“appearance” by the lender, which is a required prerequisite to the borrower being obligated to pay the lenders’ costs
and expenses. Yet, these conditions are incorporated in standard mortgage documents upon which lenders rely to
collect a bankruptcy fee.
145
See JOHN RAO, ODETTE WILLIAMSON & TARA TWOMEY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, FORECLOSURES:
DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE SERVICING 177 (2d. ed. 2007) (“If all the lender is doing is “monitoring”
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Delinquency and default fees can be a substantial source of profit for servicers.146 The
requirement that an itemization be attached to a bankruptcy claim could be a valuable check to
the financial incentives of mortgage servicers to overreach and to charge unreasonable or illegal
fees. However, the itemizations suffer two fatal defects—a lack of standardization and a lack of
detail—that inhibit any meaningful review of the amount of mortgagees’ claims. By describing
charges in vague generalities, creditors can eviscerate the purpose of the proof of claim process,
which is to ensure that creditors offer evidence of their debt.
Individualized review of “other” fees on claims highlights some instances of suspicious
fees. While the data admittedly do not permit concrete findings of servicer misconduct, courts
that have conducted evidentiary hearings to determine the validity of servicing fees have
invalidated charges similar to these and sanctioned creditors for misbehavior.147 The key point
that can be substantiated by the itemization data is that servicers fail to provide the necessary
information to allow debtors or trustees to review the claims. The resulting situation permits
servicers to overcharge debtors without fear of challenge. These problems suggest that the
bankruptcy system may be harboring mortgage servicing abuse, rather than functioning as a
system to protect homeowners from impermissible charges.
Anecdotal reports suggest that creditors proffer similarly vague itemizations to borrowers
facing state law foreclosure.148 Indeed, given the additional safeguards inherent in the bankruptcy
process, the data may understate the difficulty that nonbankrupt homeowners face in reviewing
default or foreclosure costs. Inside or outside of bankruptcy, the law does not appear to be
functioning as intended to ensure that creditors must satisfy the evidentiary burden to show that
charges are permissible under applicable law.
C. Discrepancies between Debtors’ Schedules and Mortgagees’ Claims
The proof of claim process is the mechanism for fixing the amount of the debtor’s
obligation. When they file Chapter 13 bankruptcy, most homeowners are in default on their
mortgages.149 Thus, most claims seek to establish both the amount of the arrearage and the
amount of the outstanding principal remaining on the loan. These amounts are treated differently
in Chapter 13 cases. To retain their homes, debtors must “cure any default within a reasonable
time,”150 normally by making payments over the period of the Chapter 13 plan (three to five
years) or a shorter period as fixed by the bankruptcy court.151 Any regular mortgage payments
also continue to be due as set forth in the note. Debtors must pay both the arrearages and their
ongoing mortgage payments to retain their homes and receive a discharge of remaining
unsecured debt.152 Thus, part of the pre-bankruptcy calculus that debtors and their attorneys
the bankruptcy . . . then these activities do not constitute the practice of law and should not be compensable as an
attorney fee. These routine administrative services are generally not compensable under any reading of typical
mortgage provisions.” (citations omitted)).
146
See Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007 (“Borrower advocates
fear that fees imposed during periods of delinquency and even foreclosure can offset losses that lenders and
servicers incur.”).
147
See Part I.D., supra (discussing Jones v. Wells Fargo and In re Parsley cases).
148
See Morgenson, supra note 146 (reporting that a payoff demand statement that Countrywide provided to a
borrower had line items identified only as “fees due” and “additional fees and costs” that totaled $8525).
149
See note 25, supra.
150
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
151
2 KEITH LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 133.1 (3d ed. 2000) (“It is astonishing and baffling that a
significant portion of listed claims are never filed in Chapter 13 cases.”).
152
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
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should consider in determining whether a debtor can save their home in bankruptcy is whether
the debtor will have sufficient income to both payments.153 To weigh the viability of Chapter 13
and consider alternatives such as Chapter 7 bankruptcy or surrendering the home, debtors and
their attorneys need a fairly accurate estimate of the amount of the outstanding arrearage and the
amount of the total mortgage debt.
This section analyzes data to measure whether debtors and creditors agree on the amount
of the mortgage debt. The goal was to determine if either party had a substantial
misunderstanding of the amount of the debt. For this analysis, I matched each home loan listed
on a particular debtor’s schedule to its corresponding proof of claim.154 I then measured the
direction and extent of the gap between debtors’ and mortgagees’ calculations of the mortgage
debt.155 If the amount on the claim exceeded the mortgage debt on the debtor’s schedule, I
termed the gap in the “creditor’s favor.” In these instances, the creditor is asserting that more
dollars are owed in the mortgage debt than the debtor believed was owed. Conversely, if the
scheduled amount of mortgage debt exceeded the amount on the mortgagee’s claim, I termed the
gap in the “debtor’s favor.” Here, the gap between the schedule and the claim resulted from the
debtor overreporting the amount of mortgage debt.
Figure 3 shows what fraction of claims fell into each of three categories based on the
existence of a discrepancy between the claim and the scheduled amount of debt. Debtors and
creditors agreed on the amount owing for only 74 of 1675 loans (4.4%). For the vast majority of
loans (95.6%), the debtor and mortgagee did not agree on the amount of mortgage debt. In about
one-quarter of instances (25.2%), the debtor’s scheduled amount exceeded the mortgagee’s
claim. However, the majority of claims exceeded the debtor’s calculation. Seven in ten (70.4%)
claims asserted that the mortgage debt was greater than what the debtor listed on the schedule.

153

Melissa Jacoby, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Bankruptcy Reform and
Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 337 (2007) (arguing that failure of debtors’ lawyers to screen their
clients for ability to complete a Chapter 13 repayment plan results in more unsuitable debtors in Chapter 13).
154
It was not possible to perform this matching for every home loan. Among the 2164 home loans in the sample,
only 1768 proofs of claim were filed.
155
For the gap analysis, some loans and their corresponding claims had to be eliminated. First, loans were
eliminated if the Schedule D or the proof of claim had a zero or a blank entry for the amount of the debt. These are
usually placeholders, akin to listing the debt as “unknown.” Second, loans were eliminated if the schedules and
claims were not attempting to calculate the same thing. This usually occurred because one party listed only the
arrearage amount and the other calculated the entire outstanding mortgage debt, both arrearage and principal. These
cases were excluded from the gap analysis because the disagreement was in large part a result of the parties not
trying to communicate the identical debt. In a very small number of instances, when both the creditor and the debtor
clearly provided only the arrearage amount, the cases were used in gap analysis because the discrepancy in
calculation can be fairly compared. Finally, twelve loans were removed as outliers. Two criteria were used to
identify these situations. Six loans were eliminated because the gap between the claim and the scheduled debt
exceeded 200% of the amount of the scheduled debt. An additional six loans were deemed outliers because the gap
exceeded $100,000 in absolute dollars and the gap was greater than 50% of the amount of the scheduled debt.
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Figure 3: Percent of Claims by Type of Gap Between Claim and Scheduled Debt
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Figure 3 shows that as an initial matter the debtor and creditor do not agree on the
amount of the debt in a vast majority of cases. The mere existence of discrepancies is not itself
alarming. The findings in Figure 3 could merely reflect minor differences in recordkeeping.
Alternatively, the claims could consistently be larger because of the addition of modest and
explainable post-bankruptcy charges such as accrued interest.156 I explore these explanations
with additional analyses, ultimately concluding that the data do not suggest that either reason can
fully explain the discrepancies in creditors’ and debtors’ calculations.
The first indication that the disagreements may be genuine and serious comes from
evidence on the dollar size of the gaps. Among all loans, the median claim exceeded its
corresponding scheduled debt by $1366. The average difference between a claim and its
scheduled debt was $3533.157 In the typical bankruptcy, a mortgage creditor asserts that it is
owed a significantly larger amount than the debtor believed was the home debt. These errors are
too large to reflect small recordkeeping situations, such as a single late charge imposed since the
debtor’s most recent mortgage statement or a post-bankruptcy property inspection.
The second indication that post-bankruptcy charges cannot explain most of the
differences in debtors’ and creditors’ calculations is the existence of claims in which the debtor
overestimated the amount of the debt. Post-bankruptcy charges can only explain discrepancies in
favor of creditors. Debtors do not know whether such charges will be imposed and cannot
include them in their schedules. The debtor’s favor gaps suggest that the disagreement occurs for
a different reason, at least in many instances.
Further analysis reinforces the conclusion that the gaps between claims and scheduled
debts reflect a serious misunderstanding. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the size of the gap
156

The debtors’ schedules should only reflect the amount due at the time of the bankruptcy. The proof of claim form
should be identical, as the instructions specify that the amount should be the “Total Amount of Claim at Time Case
Filed.” However, some creditors ignored this instruction and listed charges that arose after the bankruptcy was filed
and before the claim was filed (a period of usually less than sixty days).
157
N=1675. The analysis included those loans in which the claim and scheduled amount were identical (no gap).
The standard deviation for the entire sample was 11,480.
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amounts between claims and the corresponding scheduled debt. At every interval, the number of
loans in which the creditor’s claim exceeded the scheduled amount was greater than the number
of times in which debtors estimated a higher debt. While the disagreements go in both directions
(with debtors and creditors each reporting a higher amount of debt in some instances), creditor
more frequently charge more than debtors think is owed.
Figure 4: Gap Between Proofs of Claim and Schedule D Amounts
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Creditor-favor gaps were consistently larger than debtor-favor gaps. The median gap for
loans in which the claim exceeded the scheduled amount (creditor’s favor) was $3311. The
average creditor’s favor gap was $6309. The size of the typical gap in the debtor’s favor was
much less. The median was $1090, less than one third of the gap for creditor’s favor loans
($3311).158 The bottom line in Figure 4 shows that debtor-favor gaps were of modest amounts,
with the vast majority of such differences in calculations less than $2000. The top line in Figure
4, however, shows that very large gaps were much more common when the creditor’s calculation
exceeded the debtor’s calculation. Many creditors requested payment on the proof of claim of
several thousand more dollars than debtors thought they owed.
Of course, mortgage debts are relatively large in absolute size. It is difficult to articulate
an exact standard for a “minor” versus “major” disagreement and to know at what point the gaps
are sufficiently large that the bankruptcy process is undermined if these discrepancies are not
being identified and resolved. An alternative to measuring the gaps in absolute dollars large is to
158

The average gap among the debtors’ favor claims was $5376. As with the creditors’ favor claims, the size of the
average reflects a substantial number of claims with very large gaps. The standard deviation of the debtors’ favor
claims was 13,704. The standard deviation for the creditors’ favor claims was 9143.
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consider the size of the gaps in relation to the amount of the claims. For this analysis, I calculated
the percentage size of each gap in relation to the amount of the debtor’s scheduled debt. For
example, if a debtor’s schedule listed an outstanding mortgage obligation of $100,000 and the
corresponding proof of claim was for $110,000, the gap is $10,000. As a percentage of the
amount of scheduled debt, the gap is 10%. I grouped these percentage-size data into categories as
shown in Figure 5 for creditor’s favor claims (70.6% of all loans). About four in ten (40.4%) of
all loans in the Mortgage Study sample had a mortgage claim that exceeded the corresponding
debtor’s scheduled amount by less than 5%. The more alarming findings concern the portion of
claims in which the creditor’s claim was much higher than the debtor’s amount. The gap was
between 5 and 15% of the debtor’s calculation of the mortgage debt for 21.4% of all loans in the
sample. Another 8.8% of loans had mortgage claims that were more than 15% higher than the
amount of debt as calculated by the debtor on their schedules. Given their size, it seems
implausible these discrepancies resulted from valid post-bankruptcy charges amounts or an
underestimation by debtors relying on the prior month’s mortgage statement to complete the
bankruptcy schedules. Instead, the magnitude of these differences suggests a real
misunderstanding between debtors and creditors about the amount of mortgage debt.
Figure 5: Frequency of Creditors’ Favor Gaps,
Calculated as Percentage of Claimed Amount
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Unfortunately, the data do not permit an analysis of what portion of the disagreement
about the debts relate to arrearage and what fraction, if any, is due to differing calculations of
outstanding principal. Creditors and debtors were not consistent enough in separating these
amounts to make any systematic comparison. Given that the outstanding principal appears on
each mortgage statement that a debtor receives, it seems likely that at least some fraction of the
disagreement is attributable to default charges and fees. These costs cannot be easily calculated
by debtors, who may only take into account missed payments in determining the arrearage
amount. To the extent the gaps between claims and scheduled amounts represent default fees,
they offer a powerful reminder of how quickly mortgage debt can mushroom and how difficult it
can be for debtors to find the income to cure arrearages.
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A final rebuttal to the assertion that the gap data indicate the existence of only minor
misunderstandings comes from a system-wide analysis. On an aggregate basis, the disagreements
between debtors and mortgagees are a multi-billion dollar problem. Based solely on the
Mortgage Study sample of approximately 1700 loans, millions of dollars are at risk of
misallocation. Figure 6 shows the total of all debtor’s favor claims (scheduled amount exceeded
claim) and all creditor’s favor claims (claim exceeded scheduled amount). When viewed from a
systems standpoint,159 the cumulative effect of the discrepancies is enormous. Mortgage creditors
requested nearly six million dollars more on proofs of claims than the debtors reflected on their
schedules. The mismatch between debtors’ and creditors’ calculations tilts sharply in favor of
creditors.
Figure 6: Total Amount of Gaps Between Claims and Scheduled Amounts
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Extrapolating this finding beyond the Mortgage Sample shows the scope of the problem
for the entire bankruptcy system. About 400,000 homeowners have filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy
in recent years.160 Multiplying the six million dollar gap from the sample of 1700 cases to the
total homeowners in Chapter 13 indicates that each year mortgagees claim over one billion
dollars more than debtors believed was owed. If even a small fraction of this billion dollar
aggregate sum represents creditors overreaching in their claims, the damage to the bankruptcy
process is tremendous. Debtors are surprised after filing bankruptcy by the burden of paying
their mortgage debt, and distributions to other creditors could be unfairly skewed.
The substantial number of cases with large discrepancies shows that debtors and creditors
operate in bankruptcy with very different understandings of the amount of mortgage debt. The
most likely explanation for this phenomenon may be that debtors and creditors simply have
different records or lack reliable records. The finding that debtors overestimate their obligations
in just over one quarter of loans is consistent with this hypothesis. Debtors get no benefit from
inflating their mortgage debt on their bankruptcy schedules. In most cases, neither debtors nor
159

Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997).
American Bankruptcy Institute, Quarterly Non-Business Filings by Chapter (1994–2007),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=49785&TEMPLATE=/CM/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
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their attorneys appear to confirm the amount of the mortgage debt with the creditor at the time of
the bankruptcy filing.161 The data strongly suggest that many debtors file bankruptcy without
knowing how much their mortgage creditors thinks is owed. The problem could reflect a
different phenomenon. Creditors’ claims may themselves be bloated and overstate the accurate
amount of the debt. Such problems could result from servicers’ practices of loading claims with
default fees that are not disclosed to debtors, or because of mistaken calculations of the amount
due in preparing the proof of claim; case law has documented both effects.162
Regardless of which party’s calculation is correct, and even assuming all parties’
behavior is unintentional, serious policy consequences occur from the system’s failure to resolve
these discrepancies. If the mortgagee is actually owed a smaller amount than the debtor thought
was due, the counseling process regarding the advisability of bankruptcy was based on
misinformation. If the arrearages were significantly less than the debtor believed, viable
alternatives could have existed to Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Perhaps the debtor could have
borrowed the amount necessary to cure the default in one payment. Or perhaps the debtor would
have tried asking the servicer for a repayment plan outside of bankruptcy.
The creditor-favor gaps raise equal, or more serious, harms. Additional amounts of
mortgage debt have meaningful effects on families in bankruptcy. If creditors are overreaching
by even half of the amount suggested by either the absolute dollar or percentage analysis, they
are imposing a hefty burden on debtors’ disposable income and diverting money from unsecured
creditors. Claims that are bloated by default fees or enlarged due to a servicer’s miscalculations
diminish bankruptcy’s potential as a home-saving device.
To prevent the harms from either type of gap, two changes are needed. Debtor’s attorneys
should obtain an up-to-date statement of their client’s mortgage obligations from the creditor
before counseling a debtor to file Chapter 13. Then, after a bankruptcy is filed, attorneys and
debtors should verify the accuracy and reasonableness of mortgagees’ claims, examining the
source of any discrepancy between the claim and the scheduled amount. To enable this latter
practice, creditors must be held to the evidentiary standard for proofs of claims and must produce
complete and clear documentation of their calculations. Without these changes, the functioning
of the bankruptcy process is impaired.
D. Claims Objections
The findings in the prior parts of the Article offer a trio of indicia that undermine
confidence in the claims system. Mortgagees often presented claims without required
documentation; many claims contained requests for suspicious fees; and mortgagees’ claims and
debtors’ records were rarely identical. The proof of claim process has an existing, internal
mechanism to address such problems. Under section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, any party in
interest may object to a claim.163 If such an objection is made, “the court, after notice and
hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim.”164
Despite these procedures, mortgage creditors are rarely called to task for the widespread
deficiencies in their claims. Objections were identified to correspond with only 67 of the 1768
161

Servicer practices may deter debtors from getting such information. As explained above in Part I.A, servicers
have no reputational concern about poor customer service response, and so many servicers make it time-consuming
and difficult for a debtor to reach them. Additionally, the industry practice of imposing a “payoff” fee or a
“statement fee” discourages debtors from making an account inquiry.
162
See supra text accompanying notes 60–64.
163
11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
164
11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
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proofs of claim in the sample. In other words, objections were filed in response to only 4% of all
claims. Debtors, trustees, and other creditors simply do not object to mortgagees’ claims—even
when such claims do not meet the standard for prima facie validity because the claims did not
comply with the unambiguous requirements of Rule 3001;165 even such claims contained vague
or suspicious fees; and even when such claims exceeded the debtors’ calculation of the debt by
thousands of dollars. A debtor’s attorney who has developed a training program to educate
attorneys about mortgage servicing issues has concluded “that the vast majority of Chapter 13
debtors and their attorneys do little or nothing about these illegal fees and charges.”166
Among the objections that were filed, there were no observable patterns. The objections
came from a variety of districts.167 While many districts had only one objection, no district had
more than seven objections. It appears that no jurisdiction has a strong local practice of
reviewing and objecting to claims that would distinguish it from national norms.
Debtors filed more than two thirds of all objections (44 objections); Chapter 13 trustees
filed the remaining objections. Debtors’ objections usually alleged substantive problems with the
claims. The most common basis for objection was a disagreement about the amount of the claim.
These situations alleged a variety of wrongs: the claim contained excessive fees; the escrow
amount was incorrect; the attorney fees were not itemized; or the mortgagee double-charged for
property tax. In a few instances, the debtor contested the inclusion of any arrearages in the claim
because the debtor believed the loan was current. Chapter 13 trustees typically focused on
procedural problems with claims. The trustees’ most frequent basis for objection was simply that
a claim was a duplicate of a previously filed claim. Trustees’ other objections were for egregious
or facial errors. The sample contains trustee objections because a claim was for a borrower other
than the bankruptcy debtor or because the claim was filed after the bar date for filing claims. The
tiny number of objections makes it difficult to develop any useful model of why objections were
filed in these cases and not in other claims with documentation deficiencies, unidentified fees, or
discrepancies with debtors’ schedules.
Neither the few high profile cases about mortgage servicing abuse nor the anecdotal
allegations of widespread problems with the reliability of mortgage claims appear to have
sparked more scrutiny of claims. The formal objection process for deficient or incorrect claims is
largely dormant. The written law that governs claims does not appear in reality to translate into a
functional check on mortgage servicing abuse. Many mortgage claims fail to comply with the
bankruptcy rules and procedures, request unidentified or suspicious fees, or reflect a serious
discrepancy between debtors’ and creditors’ records. Yet, no objection was filed in response to
96% of all claims, despite these problems. While Congress has emphasized the importance of a
reliable bankruptcy system that garners the public’s trust,168 creditors face no meaningful
consequences when they disregard the law and this public policy and submit incomplete or
unsubstantiated claims for judicial approval.
The number of formal objections could understate the scrutiny that claims receive. Parties
could be informally working out disagreements about claims. This hypothesis, however, is
incongruent with the rare incidence of amended claims. Amended claims were located to
165

Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 3001(f) (“A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.”).
166
O. Max Gardner III, Mortgage Securitization, Servicing, and Consumer Bankruptcy, 2 GP Solo Law Trends &
News (Sept. 2005),
http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/newsletter/lawtrends/0509/business/mortgagesecuritization.html.
167
Twenty-five of the forty-four judicial districts had at least one claims objections.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 105–06.
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correspond with only 9.7% of all mortgagees’ initial claims. If creditors were being called to task
through informal processes like phone calls from debtors’ counsel or negotiations at plan
confirmation hearings, the result in most of such situations should be an amended claim.169
Further, my interviews with dozens of consumer attorneys before beginning this study revealed
only a few practitioners have a regular practice of reviewing all mortgage claims.170 The highvolume nature of consumer practice undoubtedly explains this situation, but does not excuse it.
The missing documentation and the lack of standardized and detailed itemizations only heighten
the financial and time costs to review claims.
The data offer a cautionary tale about relying on the formal law to actually function as
intended to protect parties. Very few mortgage claims meet the ideal of the bankruptcy process; a
majority of claims lack documentation and reflect a sizeable discrepancy in recordkeeping
between the debtor and creditor. Unambiguous law exists to address such problems. For decades,
the system has relied on these procedures to safeguard the integrity of bankruptcy distributions.
Yet, the paucity of objections shows a collective failure of the system to identify even patently
defective claims.
Verifying that debtors only pay amounts to which creditors are legally entitled should be
a routine part of bankruptcy representation. This is a reasonable burden to impose on attorneys
given the large size of mortgage claims and the requirement that a debtor must pay all mortgage
arrearage debt in full to save their home. Similarly, trustees have a statutory obligation to object
to improper claims,171 yet rarely do so. The current system fails to offer sufficient incentives to
encourage attorneys and trustees to obtain the additional information necessary to ensure that the
amounts paid to mortgagees are correct. Similarly, the current system suggests that creditors can
operate with the knowledge that their claims will not be reviewed or challenged. Combined with
the financial incentives of servicers to overreach and the anecdotal evidence of servicing
abuse,172 there is a serious risk that overreaching or errors by servicing is imposing unfair
burdens on families trying to save their homes. The evidence from the bankruptcy courts calls
into question the ability of consumers to trust their mortgage servicers to accurately and fairly
account for their payments and assess charges.

169

Another possibility is that the plan confirmation process serves as a check on the accuracy of claims. In their
proposed Chapter 13 repayment plans, debtors may be relying on their calculations of the amounts due, rather than
using the amount of the mortgagee’s claim as the basis for the required repayment. If the creditor does not object to
the plan, the order confirming the plan would trump the claim for purposes of the required payment in bankruptcy.
Conversely, creditors may be objecting to the amount of mortgage debt in the plan and if the objections are
sustained, the plans would be conformed to the creditors’ claims. The extent to which confirmed Chapter 13 plans
reflect the creditors’ claims or the debtors’ scheduled amounts or some compromise between these discrepant
numbers is an empirical question. The difficulty in testing this hypothesis is that in most districts, the plan contains
only the amount of prepetition arrearage. Yet, some claims did not specify the arrearage or combined prepetition and
postpetition amounts. Thus, despite my efforts to do so, it is impossible to compare either the total claim or the total
arrearage between confirmed plans and the proofs of claim in any significant fraction of cases.
170
O. Max Gardner III is the most prominent example of a debtor’s counsel who always reviews mortgage claims.
Indeed, he has developed a “boot camp” to train other attorneys on this practice. ABC Nightline, Bankruptcy
Bootcamp, Dec. 14, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/RealtyCheck/story?id=4002397&page=1 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2008).
171
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).
172
See Part I.A and D, supra.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
The systemic failure of the claims process to ensure that mortgage creditors are collecting
only what they are legally owed harms debtors, other non-mortgage creditors, and the integrity of
the bankruptcy system. Yet, the most distressing implication may be the data’s suggestion that
mortgage servicing abuse may be even more prevalent beyond bankruptcy.
A. Proof of Claim Process
The problems with mortgage claims are structural. Creditors should comply with federal
law if they expect to receive distributions in bankruptcy. Debtors and their attorneys also must
bear responsibility for ensuring accurate payments. Objections to claims do not appear with
sufficient frequency to police claims, even with regard to large debts such as mortgages. The
current claims process is malfunctioning.
Mortgagees’ failure to satisfy Rule 3001 should not be dismissed as a mere technicality.
The rules governing claims were implemented to prevent substantive harm. Without
documentation of the debt, the debtor and other creditors cannot verify the legitimacy or
accuracy of claims, each of which cuts into the limited dollars available for distribution. Poor
compliance with the claims rules effectively deflects creditors’ obligations onto cash-strapped
bankrupt families, who must choose between the costs of filing an objection or the risks of
overpayment. Deficiencies in the claims process can permit unmeritorious or excessive claims to
dilute the participation of legitimate creditors and prevent the just administration of bankruptcy
estates.173 Further, from a systems standpoint, it is hard to discern the benefit of allowing parties
to “opt-out” of rules at will. Reforms to the claims process will protect the integrity of the
bankruptcy system.
Mortgagees’ frequent failure to comply with Rule 3001 results from weaknesses in the
current rules, which do not deter creditors from disregarding the documentation requirements.
While the rules themselves use mandatory language, phrased in terms of “shall,”174 the reality is
that some creditors treat them as aspirations—or ignore them entirely. In most instances, there is
no negative consequence to the mortgagee from its failure to attach the required documentation.
Under the current system, the main tool to fight improper claims is Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9011, which requires all factual contentions in pleadings to have evidentiary
support.175 While courts have sanctioned creditors for filing unsubstantiated claims,176 Rule 9011
was not designed to correct the systematic failure of other rules. Rule 3001(f) provides a “carrot”
to encourage compliance by granting prima facie validity to claims that are executed and filed in
compliance with Rule 3001.177 Yet, as a practical matter, all claims receive this treatment if
173

Gardner v. State of N.J., 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947).
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c)–(d). The proof of claim form (B10) also contains a sheet of instructions, which states,
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neither the debtor nor another party in interest objects to the claim. Creditors can rely on the lack
of scrutiny to validate their claims and sidestep the burdens of Rule 3001.
The consequences of disregarding Rule 3001 needs to be sharpened. Even when an
objection is filed, there is typically no sanction for missing documentation. Some courts have
concluded that failure to comply with Rule 3001 is not a permissible basis for disallowing a
claim,178 because this behavior is not listed in section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
governs claims allowance. A few jurisdictions have taken a different approach and ruled that
incomplete claims documentation can be a basis for disallowing a claim.179 The majority rule
seems to be that a claim that does not comply with Rule 3001 loses its prima facie evidentiary
effect, which shifts the burden to mortgagees to prove their claim. However, courts usually
require the debtor to advance some evidence that disputes the claim and not merely point to
noncompliance with the rule.180 If the servicer is uncooperative, and for example, refuses to
promptly provide a complete and comprehensible payment history, the debtor may have a
difficult time actually forcing the creditor—the party in control of the records—to meet the
burden that the rules impose upon it. An affidavit from the debtor may suffice in such cases, and
the courts seem to be increasingly sympathetic to debtors’ frustrations with obtaining
information from mortgage servicers.181
The simplest route to boosting the reliability of mortgage claims is to revise section
502(b) to include the failure to provide the attached documentation as a basis for claims
disallowance. This reform would ratchet up the consequences for failing to attach a note or
security interest. In effect, a creditor, who could not validate the existence of the purported debt
with a note (or could not adequately explain why a note was unavailable), could not receive more
in bankruptcy than it would have been entitled to had it been put to its proof in a judicialforeclosure lawsuit. In this way, the bankruptcy process would be at least as rigorous as the
foreclosure scheme outside of the federal system.
Another strategy is to squarely impose the burden of reviewing mortgage claims on
trustees. The Bankruptcy Code already states that a trustee shall “if a purpose would be served,
examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.”182 Many
trustees apparently believe that no purpose would be served by objecting to claims without the
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requires disallowance of the claim.”). Cf. In re McLaughlin, 05-63927 (Ct. Aug. 31, 2007) (disallowing claims filed
by trustee pursuant to Rule 3004 because trustee did not reasonably investigate claims and provide documentation to
support the claims.).
180
In re Campbell, 336 B.R. 430, 434 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a proof of claim that lacks documentation
required by Rule 3001(c) is not disallowed unless the debtor’s claim objection contests the amount of the debt and
not merely the rule violation).
181
See In re Heath, 331 B.R. 424, 437 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“Moreover, a creditor’s lack of adequate response to a
debtor’s formal or informal inquiries in itself may raise an evidentiary basis to object to the unsupported aspects of
the claim, or even a basis for evidentiary sanctions, thereby coming within Section 502(b)’s grounds to disallow a
claim.” (citations omitted)).
182
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1027961

38

Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims

documentation required by law. For example, while notes were missing from forty percent of
claims, trustees filed only one or two objections that raised that issue.
The U.S. Trustee Program could mandate mortgage claims review as an official duty of
panel and standing trustees in their program handbook, and trustees could be evaluated, in part,
on their fulfillment of this duty. This solution is informal, requiring no legislative reform. The
proposal merely posits that the U.S. Trustee Program would ensure that trustees carry out the
statutory mandate in a rigorous fashion. This solution eliminates the need to create incentives for
debtors’ attorneys to make claims objections in the first instance. The U.S. Trustee Program
could use standards and procedures that parallel those used when auditing debtors’ schedules. If
the Chapter 13 trustees’ examinations revealed serious or systematic misconduct, the problems
could be referred to the U.S. Trustee for enforcement activity. In 2007, the U.S. Trustee took a
step in this direction by becoming involved in litigation over alleged wrongdoing by mortgage
servicers.183
A complementary tactic to these enforcement strategies would improve the clarity of
claims. The varying formats and level of detail in the itemizations dramatically increase the costs
in reviewing claims, rendering it prohibitively expensive and inefficient for the high-volume
consumer bankruptcy system. If itemizations were standardized, it would be easier to train legal
assistants and junior attorneys to review claims. Standardization would also facilitate the
development of computer programs to analyze the creditors’ calculations for items such as
escrow accounts and arrearage payment streams. A model itemization attachment was
promulgated by a committee of mortgage industry representatives and Chapter 13 trustees and
mortgage servicers.184 The model attachment would require servicers to provide details such as
the type of the loan, its interest rate, and any payment adjustment dates. It also sets out a
standardized format for servicers to break out the amount of any pre-petition arrearages,
categorize each charge, and report how many times each type of charge had been imposed. The
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules should review the model itemization and consider
incorporating it into the Official Form 10 and Rule 3001(a), at least for mortgage claims.
Voluntary adoption seems unlikely as the form has not yet been adopted, despite its existence for
many months. Notably, the participation of industry representative in creating the model
itemization does reflect some willingness by servicers to admit that their bankruptcy procedures
need improvement.
The solutions outlined here would systematically improve mortgage claims.185 Given the
empirical evidence of widespread problems with mortgage claims, these approaches may be the
most efficient solution. The realities of consumer bankruptcy practice may dictate structural
solutions that do not rely on the voluntary participation of individual actors. While such reforms
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would modestly increase the administrative burdens, the benefits of increased reliability in
mortgage claims justify these policy changes.
B. Bankruptcy as a Home-saving Device
Mortgage claims are a key determinant of the outcome of consumer bankruptcy cases. A
core function of Chapter 13 bankruptcy is helping families save their homes,186 which the
Bankruptcy Code effectuates by permitting debtors to cure arrearages on mortgages over time.187
Because mortgage creditors are most Americans’ largest creditor, their actions in bankruptcies
heavily influence debtors’ success in saving their homes from foreclosure.188 A family’s ability
to confirm a Chapter 13 plan or cure a default may turn on the amount fixed as owing to the
mortgage creditor.189 Debtors cannot easily generate additional disposable income if alleged
obligations to mortgagees magically increase or if fees multiply without justification. The
debtor’s ability to pay mortgage arrearages, as a practical matter, determines the success of a
case. Not only does plan confirmation turn on this issue, if the debtor misses any plan payments,
the mortgage creditor frequently will seek relief from the stay to proceed with a foreclosure and
the debtor’s bankruptcy may be dismissed. Thus, the amounts of mortgage proofs of claim have
direct effects on bankruptcy’s usefulness as a home-saving device.
Miscalculations about mortgage debt have grave consequences for families at nearly
every point in the bankruptcy system. From the outset, debtors may be harmed if they make the
bankruptcy filing decision without accurate knowledge of their mortgage debts. If debtors
underestimate the amount of their outstanding obligations to mortgagees, which the data show
occurs in the majority of cases, their attorneys may misadvise them about the feasibility of
confirming a Chapter 13 plan and the likelihood that they can cure their mortgage default.
Conversely, if debtors overestimate the arrearage, they could file bankruptcy without pursuing
other types of relief, such as borrowing from families or friends, seeking forbearance from the
mortgagee, or selling an asset. Debtors’ inability to report their mortgage debt with reasonably
accuracy indicates a serious shortcoming in the pre-bankruptcy counseling process. The data
suggest that attorneys who do not verify the mortgage debt may give suboptimal advice to their
clients about the advisability of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. This situation could be one factor that
contributes to the low success rate of debtors completing Chapter 13 repayment plans.190
After families file bankruptcy, discrepancies in debtors’ and creditors’ records of the
amount of mortgage debt and incomplete mortgagee proofs of claim lead to either of two
undesirable consequences. In most instances, the data show that debtors do not verify the amount
requested on the mortgagees’ claim and risk overpaying that creditor. In so doing, debtors
increase their burden in confirming and completing a Chapter 13 plan. This outcome, however,
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saves the debtor the litigation and negotiation costs of seeking clarification from the mortgagee.
When mortgagees’ claims are challenged, the debtor faces increased costs for their attorneys’
time in this work. Proofs of claim with unexplained or impermissible fees, or without adequate
documentation, drive up the expense of bankruptcy relief, a consequence that financiallystrapped families can ill afford.
Despite these costs, debtors may benefit substantially from challenging mortgage claims.
Bloated claims make it more difficult for a family to confirm repayment plans. Because
arrearages must be paid in full, every dollar of savings is a direct benefit to a family who would
have to dismiss their Chapter 13 case and surrender its home if the original arrearage amount
were allowed to stand. Improved accuracy by mortgage servicers in bankruptcy cases could save
litigation costs in response to motions for relief from stay that are based on incorrect accounting.
Scrutinizing the proof of claim to ensure that only valid fees are included in arrearage
claims can help reduce the burdens that debtors face in making all required Chapter 13 plan
payments. Reduced arrearages could improve the success rate of debtors in completing Chapter
13 plans and receiving a discharge. Better outcomes in Chapter 13 could help encourage more
debtors to consider this alternative, and boost recovery to all creditors. Further, ensuring that the
mortgagees’ accounting is accurate at the time of the confirmation can help prevent disputes
about the amount of mortgage debt that remains to be paid after the bankruptcy case is complete.
Debtors would benefit substantially if consumer bankruptcy attorneys incorporated a
routine review of mortgage claims in the scope of their representation. Given the recent
escalation in attorneys’ fees that occurred after BAPCPA,191 it is discouraging to suggest that the
solution lies in passing the costs of claims review along to debtors. The structural changes
suggested in the prior section would reduce the costs of claims review in various ways, and in
some instances they would change the incentives of debtors’ attorneys to monitor the accuracy of
claims.
Taking those suggestions a step further, debtors’ attorneys need to be educated about the
potential benefits to their practice of challenging mortgage claims. While challenging a claim
does not per se generate revenue for an attorney, claims review can reveal other causes of action.
Most obviously, if consumer attorneys request information from mortgage servicers and receive
no response or an inadequate response, the servicer may have violated the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”). If successful, these claims entitle plaintiffs to actual damages and
the costs of reasonable attorneys’ fees.192 An objection may also generate evidence of a practice
that can be challenged under a state’s unfair or deceptive practices act, which typically also
permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff is successful.193 In some instances, review
of mortgage claims can reveal causes of action that allege violations in how the loan was
originated. For example, a review of the Truth-in-Lending disclosure can give rise to a claim for
actual or statutory damages, or even rescission of the loan under some circumstances.194 The
Truth in Lending Act also is fee-shifting so that mortgage companies may be ordered to pay the
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attorneys’ fees and costs of successful actions.195 These examples show how bankruptcy can be
the locus for identifying a variety of illegal lending activity. Reviewing mortgage claims should
be merely the first step in helping a family stop a foreclosure or untangle itself from the harm of
an inappropriate or predatory home loan.
The data provide systematic evidence that mortgage servicers do not adequately
document their claims and may be engaged in overreaching in assessing fees and calculating
outstanding obligations. The current state of mortgage claims puts debtors at risk. Each time a
family loses its home based on an inaccurate claim, the bankruptcy system fails. Inflated
mortgage claims undercut a core bankruptcy policy of helping families in financial trouble save
their homes and right themselves financially.
C. Sustainable Homeownership Policy
The findings on the unreliability of mortgagees’ claims have implications beyond
bankruptcy. All families who are trying to pay off a home loan are put at risk if subject to poor or
predatory mortgage servicing. Most families rely on their mortgage servicer to credit payments,
calculate pay-off balances, and apply fees only when justified. Most families do not and cannot
separately verify the servicers’ accounting. Bankruptcy data provide a lens for examining
whether Americans should trust servicers to carry out these tasks and whether the servicing
industry is adequately regulated.
It seems likely that default by a borrower may exacerbate servicing problems because
default triggers the imposition of fees, and sometimes a transfer to a loss mitigation department
or even to a new servicer. Nonetheless, the reality is that most defaults and pending foreclosures
occur outside the bankruptcy system.196 Thus, most families in default on their mortgages lack
the protections—albeit, the existing weak protections—of the bankruptcy claims process to
shield them from impermissible or unreasonable default fees. Indeed, servicers’ accounting
should be better inside the bankruptcy system than outside it because, at least in theory, a
bankruptcy is a check on mortgage overreaching. If a Chapter 13 case is filed, the servicer
usually hires an attorney who is supposed to review the claim for accuracy and illegality, and the
servicer knows that homeowners usually have retained an attorney to represent them. Not only
are mortgagees’ misbehavior or mistakes probably not confined to bankruptcy debtors, the
frightening prospect is that servicing problems among non-bankrupt families who are behind on
their mortgages may be even worse than the bankruptcy data reveal.
Very recent case law lends legitimacy to this fear. In late 2007, two federal courts in Ohio
dismissed dozens of foreclosure lawsuits on standing grounds because the plaintiffs could not
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prove they were the record owner of the mortgage and note.197 Two class action lawsuits are
pending that allege that consumers pay bloated, illegal fees for default charges.198 Mortgage
servicers are increasingly being fingered as the primary party who is frustrating homeowners’
efforts to obtain modifications of unaffordable loans.199
Poor mortgage servicing is an assault on America’s policy of promoting sustainable
homeownership. If families are hit with unreasonable fees and cannot understand what is owed
on their mortgage loan, they are at risk of foreclosure. Servicing abuse can begin before
bankruptcy, but may ultimately drive some families into bankruptcy as a last resort for trying to
address this issue. The current policy debate on homeownership is focused on loan origination
issues, such as whether mortgage brokers or lenders placed families in appropriate loans.200
Servicing problems may be less visible, but no less harmful. Research shows that the quality of
preventive servicing affects the incidence and outcome of default.201 The rising foreclosure rate
will only escalate the number of families who must struggle to understand the amount of their
arrearage and who are at risk of having to pay unreasonable default costs to save their home.202
Policies that aim to protect families from foreclosure should address the weaknesses in mortgage
servicing, and not just alter the process for loan origination. For families who are already trapped
in unaffordable loans, other relief will come too late. Improving mortgage servicing would
provide immediate protection to families facing foreclosure.
Paying a mortgage is most families’ most important financial obligation. Unreliable
servicing can cause ordinary families to overpay, even for those who avoid default and
bankruptcy. For example, inaccurate pay-off balances can penalize families when they refinance
a home loan. Even families who try to get ahead on their mortgage may lose such benefits if
servicers fail to credit additional payments to principal, instead holding them in suspense or
treating them as prepayments despite instructions to the contrary from the borrower. These
practices create a needless barrier to homeownership.
Under the current regime, consumers have no choice in servicers. Any market exists
solely based on the needs of lenders and bond issuers, whose concerns are distinct—if not
opposed—to borrowers. Jack Guttentag, emeritus professor at the Wharton School of Business,
has suggested that consumers be allowed to “fire” their servicer, essentially receiving a one-time
option to choose a different servicer.203 He postulates that servicers would compete for this
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additional business, driving up quality, and balancing servicers’ incentives between lenders and
borrowers. Another policy response to concerns about mortgage servicing is to step up
enforcement action. However, single actions against egregious servicers may not produce
systematic reform, as the Mortgage Study data suggest that servicing issues are industry-wide. A
bigger problem may simply be focusing the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) on its duties to enforce RESPA and to police mortgage servicers. HUD’s website for
complaints does not even mention mortgage servicing,204 and the Federal Trade Commission,
rather than HUD, has taken the lead in recent actions against servicers.
The Mortgage Study data suggest that policymakers who focus on promoting
homeownership need to concern themselves with mortgage servicing, which is a crucial aspect to
enabling families to achieve homeownership. Mortgage servicing abuse weakens families’
efforts to manage their mortgages successfully and can result in families being wrongfully
deprived of their homes through foreclosure or unsuccessful outcomes in bankruptcy.
Mortgagees’ failure to honor the terms of their loans and applicable law weakens America’s
homeownership policies and threatens families’ financial well-being.
The findings are a tangible reminder that merely enacting a law does not ensure its
success. Without the correct structural incentives and without robust safeguards, a law can fail to
deliver its promised protections. In the consumer context, this observation has particular power.
Consumers face disadvantages to industry in a legal system: consumers are not repeat players;
they have fewer resources; and they do not have institutional incentives to shape the system. The
bankruptcy claims process exemplifies the difficulty in developing and monitoring an effective
legal system. The findings should caution policymakers and advocates from blindly trusting in
the written law as a decontextualized instrument to shape behavior.
CONCLUSION
Hundreds of thousands of Americans file Chapter 13 bankruptcy each year hoping to
save their homes from foreclosure. Reliable claims are crucial to the success of the bankruptcy
system because the claims mechanism implements the two core goals of bankruptcy policy: to
help debtors obtain a fresh start by paying their debts and to ensure that creditors receive a fair
share of debtors’ assets. From external indicia, the claims process in consumer bankruptcy cases
may seem like an exemplar of a well-designed legal system that balances the interests of debtors
and creditors. The claims rules are unambiguous; all parties typically are represented by
attorneys; the federal judicial system brings uniformity to the procedures; and specialized actors
such as bankruptcy judges and trustees police the system.
Yet, despite these reassuring features, the empirical data establish the widespread, current
practice of mortgagees’ filing incomplete claims with vaguely identified fees. This hinders any
effective scrutiny of whether servicers are only charging the correct amounts to struggling
homeowners. The existing system is insufficient to ensure the integrity of the bankruptcy system
and its home-saving purpose. The problems with mortgagees’ calculations are likely to be even
worse outside of bankruptcy, where the rules are less clear and the procedural safeguards are
fewer. Systematic reform of mortgage servicing is needed to protect all homeowners—inside and
outside of bankruptcy— from overreaching or illegal behavior. The findings on the unreliability
of mortgage servicing are a high-stakes reminder of the challenges of designing a legal system
that actually functions to protect consumers.
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